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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to illuminate the relationship between Shah Mohammed 
Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, in the context of Shi'i 
history. The Boulding model serves as the major theoretical framework. 
It postulates three kinds of human relationships based on differing 
organizing principles, namely, the exchange system, the integrative 
system, and the threat system.
Established through a military coup d'etat in 1921 by Reza Khan (the 
father of Moahammed Reza Pahlavi) the threat system seemed to dominate 
Iran throughout the Pahlavi rule which ended in 1979. Under this kind 
of social organization, distance and legitimacy emerge as major 
variables. Activities, writings, and speeches of major public figures 
are employed to demonstrate the disparity between intent and outcome of 
the Shah's policies, and between world views and subsequent actions of 
the Shah and Khomeini.
The theoretical offerings of Wallace and Klapp, add to the Boulding 
model by postulating how societies reflect distress and disintegration, 
inherent to any threat system, and how they handle these conditions. 
Wallace concentrates on "revitalization movements" which occur within 
groups or societies suffering from threatened self-identity and involve 
re-definition in opposition to other groups. Klapp explores the role of 
villain images, facilitating the "closing of the system."
Together these themes form the background for an analysis of Shi'ism in 
Iran as an integrative system with a history of opposition to the ruling 
group, and as apparent contemporary solution for many Iranians. They 
further permit insight into the nature of the regime of Mohammed Reza 
Pahlavi, and into the role of Ayatollah Khomeini as voice of the 
opposition, charismatic leader, and as "prince" who legitimates his own 
threat system.
SHAH MOHAMMED REZA PAHLAVI AND AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI 
IN LIGHT OF SHI'I HISTORY
INTRODUCTION
HE HAS LEFT 
large photos of a gaunt, elongated face, its 
controlled features so bent on showing neither 
anxiety nor defeat that it no longer expresses 
anything at all....
HE HAS RETURNED 
A severe patriarchal face that has no intention of 
expressing anything at all fills the rest of the 
page. (And between that departure and that return, 
what heights of emotion and fervor, rage and terror, 
how many conflagrations!) (Kapuscinski 1985, 3).
To some of the scholars studying Iranian history, the recent 
revolution in Iran was an extreme reaction to social atomization, a 
byproduct of rapid change. Islam constituted a fallback ideology to 
capture the alienated, the disoriented, and the angry (Dekmajian in 
Curtis 1981, 40). To others, the revolution represented triumph over 
decades of "total repression” and over the "complete absence of rights" 
(Katouzian 1981, 332). "A nation trampled by despotism, degraded, 
forced into the role of an object, seeks shelter, seeks a place where it 
can dig itself in, wall itself off, be itself" (Kapuscinski 1985, 113). 
It is an attempt to preserve its separate identity and to regain 
security. "But a whole nation cannot emigrate, so it undertakes a 
migration in time rather than space" (Kapuscinski 1985, 113). Migration 
in time may involve self-definition in opposition to other groups, in 
terms of "what we are not." In its extreme form, this presentation of a 
united front expresses itself in schism, revolution and war. Symbols, 
rituals and institutions, rooted in commonly shared values, beliefs, 
expectations and anxieties perpetuate submission to the group--which 
becomes the magna mater, and gives renewed meaning and security to life.
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Meaning is a way of ordering. It lends context to information and to 
relations. Thus, it forms the basis for identity, and identification, 
and consequently, for autonomy. As Miller observes, societies make 
their most important adjustments to the meaning, rather than the rate of 
incoming information. If the rate alone seems to threaten identity--it 
is a sign "that the system is breaking down." One exception, however, 
is monetary information--where changes in flows activate adjustment 
processes. Thus, profound social changes may follow sudden increase in 
wealth such as oil producing countries experienced in the 1970s (Miller 
1978, 833-834). Confronted with drastic change in all spheres of life, 
over a relatively short period of time, the Iranian people faced major 
adjustments. Within the context of instability, rooted in Iranian 
history, this process threatened their separate identity. In this 
sense, intense embrace of Shi'ism, to the exclusion of other solutions, 
eliminated a multitude of behavioral elements, basic to change, and 
increased predictability of events.^
At the same time, however, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi seemingly 
offered his own kind of predictability. For instance, he apparently 
tried to facilitate social cohesion, and establish legitimacy, through 
rituals, such as the formal coronation ceremony in 1967, and the 
splendid Persepolis ceremony celebrating his 30 year rule in 1971, among 
others. (At both occasions he asserted pre-Islamic, Aryan roots, to the 
horror to Iran's devout Shi'is.) In addition, he dramatically 
strenghtened the armed forces, instituted a one-party system, in the 
name of democracy, and at least tolerated, if not encouraged, SAVAK to 
scrutinize "potential troublespots," such as labour unions, peasant 
organizations, student groups, guilds, and even mosques, instilling
pervasive fear of consequences for criticizing or disagreeing with the
regime. In concert with these strategies, the Shah pursued rapid
modernization for Iran, modeled after the West. Accordingly, favoring
progressive modernization policies, and protecting Western political and
economic interests in the region of the Persian Gulf, the West, and
particularly the United States, supported the Shah. Some observers say
support dwindled under the Carter Administration, related to American
demands for human rights in Iran, and to restricted availability of
American military equipment for Iran (Sullivan 1981, Preece 1979).
Nevertheless, the bulk of the Iranian people came to perceive the Shah
as "puppet” of the United States. They viewed the Shah and the United
States as threat to their autonomy, sovereignty, and even to their life.
In reaction, the Iranians projected their wrath onto those two major
enemies. Seemingly, they provided the common focus formerly
lacking--Shi'ism provided the organizational force--a complex
accumulation of events provided the climate ripe for revolution. The
rituals, beliefs, and practices of Shi*ism, according to historical
precedent, lent intensity and pacing to the "closing of the system,"
returning the Iranian people to illusionary safety of a lost 
2paradise. Ayatollah Khomeini presided over the "closing" by
manipulating these rituals, beliefs, and practices on behalf of the
revolution. He became the "charismatic leader," the Imam, of the
faithful by his connection (perceived by them) with some central feature
3of their existence. This centrality, coupled with intensity, 
constituted a powerful force.
With these notions in mind, and in an effort to learn how systems 
operate, whether groups or societies, I will focus on the relationship
between the regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and Shi'ism in Iran, in
light of Shi'i history. Within this context, I consider the following 
questions relevant: What was the nature of the structures and dynamics
that gave rise to the Iranian revolution? What were some of the crucial 
variables and relationships that produced the explosive mixture? How 
did Shi'ism as integrative system with its historical role as "the party 
in opposition to the regime in power" (Savory in Curtis 1981, 132), and 
as revitalization movement, contribute to contemporary events? In light 
of established principles and practices of Shi'ism, what was the role of 
Ayatollah Khomeini? In general, these are the questions I will address 
in my thesis, using the theoretical framework outlined below.
RELATIONSHIP TO THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE
Students of social change must address the social order, that is, 
social organization. Depending on their view of the world, or their 
theoretical framework, they examine structures and processes from 
differing perspectives. For Durkheim, for example, change occurs with 
societal growth and increasing population density. Society 
differentiates from a homogeneous mass into heterogeneous, 
interdependent subunits. Differences between people serve as cohesive 
force. Individual freedom slowly replaces tradition. At the same time, 
a common, underlying bond, the "collective conscience," is necessary for 
preventing estrangement while serving as basis for cooperation and 
exchange. Conflict may ensue, however, when progress intersects with 
religious beliefs and with strong collective sentiments. Change is 
unidirectional, continuous, evolutionary.
6For Marx, in contrast, change is the result of class struggle and 
alienation, common to all property systems. Alienation is an 
intolerable, contradictory, and therefore, unstable condition, linked 
solely to differential access to the means of production. It will 
ultimately result in the demise of the capitalist system. Change is 
inevitably and necessarily dialectical and revolutionary. According to 
Durkheim then, change may be seen as creation and growth, or, according 
to Marx, as schism and radical rearrangement, and then growth.
To this extent, Boulding distinguishes between kinds of change. He 
contrasts "evolutionary, developmental change," to "revolutionary, 
dialectical change" (1970). On the evolutionary side, he uses the 
bridge Spencer built, between processes in nature and processes in 
social systems. Accordingly, evolution is rooted in an ecological 
relationship where "the values describing the processes are defined 
inclusively of one another." That is, "... free individuals find 
fulfillment in lawfull cooperation, while the laws of the cooperative 
relationship free and individualize persons involved" (Hampden-Turner 
1982, 210). Or, on a more concrete level, hen, egg, hen follow each 
other in evolutionary, not revolutionary, succession (Boulding 1970). 
Thus, evolutionary processes either dovetail, or nest in each other. 
Contradictions can arise, given certain changes in the environment; 
they are not, however, inherent consequences of the inner dynamics of 
the system. Moreover, they tend to be of low intensity and shortlived.
The term dialectical can be traced from Plato, to Hegel, to Marx, 
and beyond. Boulding uses it in a "narrower, more Hegelian sense" than 
does Marx to describe historical change, namely in terms of thesis, 
antithesis, synthesis. The original system entails its own
negation--because it is built on inherent contradiction. Swings from 
one state to another involve conflict. While there are few examples of 
dialectical processes in nature--we find them in historical patterns of 
revolution and war.
In addition, Boulding postulates three kinds of human 
relationships, based on differing organizing principles. They are the 
exchange system, the integrative system, and the threat system (1970). 
These approximate Sorokin's classifications of contractual, familistic, 
and compulsory relationships. Exchange is a positive sum game where 
through interaction, all parties may gain. It is based on promises, 
rather than threats, namely on "'the promises men live by'" (Scherman, 
qtd. in Boulding 1968, 232). The integrative system relates to values, 
to love, and to how institutions acquire respect and legitimacy. Even 
within its context, exchange is present, as, for example, in families or 
integrative communities. The threat system is a zero sum game where one 
party gains at the expense of another. The threat system dominates in 
an "authoritarian state or in a military organization" (Boulding 1968, 
233). At the same time, both, the exchange and the integrative system 
are also operative, and seemingly necessary--otherwise dictators and 
generals would find their speeches superfluous. Only organizations 
whose members identify with the purpose of the organization to some 
degree can be relatively successful. For example, the "... ethical 
appeal of Socialism is primarily to the integrative system" (Boulding 
1968, 237). All social organizations then, contain these three 
relationships to a greater or lesser degree. Their stability depends on 
the relative proportion to which each organizer is present (Boulding 
1968, 233). Boulding defines social organizations as "role structures
with a communication network uniting the occupants of the roles."
Social organizations include people and artifacts "bound together by a 
network of inputs and outputs of energy and information, or objects" 
(Boulding 1970, 22). From this perspective, business exchange, or 
economic development follows evolutionary patterns --because all parties 
stand to win--unless exchange becomes involved with a threat system.
A threat system contains virtually all the dialectical elements 
found in a social process. It begins when one party says to another, 
"You do something nice for me or I'll do something nasty to you."
Threat gains credibility in the face of an established pattern of 
previously carried out threats. The subsequent process depends on the 
response from the threatened party. Response could be expressed as 
"defiance, avoidance, submission or counter-threat." Slavery is an 
example of a threat-submission relation. Here, dialectics only express 
themselves when the response changes into defiance or counter-threat. 
This can occur when either geographical or social distance increases 
between the threatener and the threatened. "Revolution is a phenomenon 
somewhat similar to war, with social distance replacing geographical 
distance as the essential variable of the threat system" (Boulding 1970, 
48). Social distance may increase when, for instance, the son of the 
threatener succeeds his father--or as a matter of course, when a faction 
or class of society has organized a threat system to establish and 
maintain itself as ruling group. Namely, under threat conditions, the 
ruling group "is cut-off from effective two-way communication," and 
becomes unresponsive to the needs, opinions and sentiments of the 
population. Information feedback has little or no effect on policy 
formation. Governmental agents act without knowledge of results of
9previous policies. This was true, for example, during the latter part 
of the Hitler regime in Nazi Germany. It was also observed in Russia 
under Stalin (Miller 1978, 852). This process magnifies the threat 
system, and widens the gulf between ruler and ruled. Gradual loss of 
power, isolation at the top, fear and alienation of the population 
evolve, and feed into the vicious cycle. As Barnard has argued, 
authority "is granted from below not from above” (qtd. in Boulding 
1968, 214). Thus, at some point in space or time, a seemingly stable 
system becomes unstable. "Revolution can only occur if the social 
distances between ruler and ruled are great” (Boulding 1970, 49). 
Accordingly, "dialectical revolution" (in contrast to "nondialectical 
revolution" discussed later in the text) involves "the emergence out of 
one system of a rival system and the revolution takes place when the 
rival system overcomes the former one and supplants it" (Boulding 1970, 
58).
Moreover, distance, defiance and counter-threats are related to the 
erosion of legitimacy. "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system 
to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political 
institutions are the most appropriate for society" (Lipset 1963, 64).
In its classic Weberian formulation, legitimacy involves transformation 
of naked power into authority which is generally accepted and obeyed 
without frequent resort to coercion (Dekmejian in Curtis 1981, 33). 
Namely, legitimacy may be established as product of the integrative 
system--or it may be established by conquest, that is, by superior 
threat. As part of the threat system, legitimacy tends to erode with 
time, rendering threats illegitimate, producing defiance and 
counter-threats, schism, revolution, and war. As Easton notes moreover,
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presence of hostility toward the government, what he calls "erosion of 
support," or in Boulding*s terms "loss of power gradient," increases the 
level of stress in the system. "At least general types of systems, such 
as absolute European monarchies, democracies, or dictatorships, have 
unmistakably failed as support for them has atrophied" (Easton 1965,
220) .
In Boulding's view, great changes are always nondialectical. They 
are related to the growth of knowledge--which is "cumulative." 
"Nondialectical revolutions" may play their part in history, as "step 
functions." They represent, however, not some inherent contradiction, 
but rather, "discontinuity in the total evolutionary process because of 
some mutation..." and can also have "profound long-term effect on the 
whole system." The evolution of life itself, particularly of man, was a 
nondialectical revolution (Boulding 1970, 57-58).
At the same time, nondialectical ideologies may become properties 
of threat systems--if they become associated with centers of political 
and economic power. Dialectical dynamics develop if power is embodied 
in a threat system. Here, power relates to power-struggling, and thus 
to the issue of "'who is the superior power’"; while in the exchange 
process, power relates to "bargaining power." The first kind of power 
aims to destroy and supplant-- the second kind of power aims only to move 
to a more favorable position, still permitting a "positive-sum game" 
(Boulding 1968). Because a naked threat system is too costly to 
maintain, the center of political power usually tries to become the 
center of an integrative system, also. It is an effort to gain status, 
respect and willing acceptance, in short, legitimacy. These ideological 
systems tend to suffer from the same malaise as threat systems in
11
general. New power centers may emerge, proclaiming a new 
ideology--which becomes the organizing principle for integration in 
opposition to old centers. Historical examples include the early 
Christian Church vis-a-vis the Roman Empire. In addition, "Islam 
provided an integrative structure for Arabs and Arab conquests"
(Boulding 1970, 70).
Wallace, relatedly, analyzes this kind of process in terms of 
"revitalization movements." Those occur when groups perceive their 
identity to be threatened, as for example, in situations of 
international politics, modernization, or factionalism within the 
society. A group redefines the situation in opposition to an enemy, in 
an effort to restore predictability.
when too many possibilities are already in the 
field, and when orderliness diminishes, the only 
possibility for improvemnet lies in simultaneously 
simplifying the repertoire and insisting on 
regularity of performance. Such procedure, often 
carried out under the auspices of religion, 
constitutes a revitalization movement (1966,
214-15).
Consequently, revitalization movements reduce the stress level in the 
system, by serving as unifying, organizing, and integrating principle. 
Sustained through rituals, they solve the self-identity dilemma (Wallace 
1966). Religion and ritual therefore, are processes in "dynamic 
interaction (equilibration) with a changing environment"; they may even 
constitute a "severe break in the continuity of the system" (d'Aquili, 
et al 1979, 312).
Klapp, moreover, postulates how groups or societies reflect 
distress and disintegration more concretely. Namely, they may use
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"demagogic rhetoric,.. characterizing events in villainous terms"
(1978, 91). The qualities imputed to "villains" reflect the kinds of 
distress society is suffering. Projecting distress onto "satan" or an 
"oppressor" allows for renewed integration, and for "closing of the 
system." Villain images facilitate this process because they embody 
anxiety in personal form, serving as focus for hostility. In this 
context, "villains" provide these three functions:
1) They sustain moral vigilance,
2) prepare for the "affirmative entrance and service of the hero,”
3) serve as reminders of "what kinds of people are to be feared, 
and of the nature of evil" (Klapp 1973; 1978, 83,91,94).
These are similar to Erikson's postulations of "boundary 
maintenance" to preserve or reestablish cohesion in communities in the 
face of perceived threat to solidarity (Erikson 1966).
Research indicates, too, that such pejorative designators 
facilitate violations against persons or groups thus designated. (It is 
easier to kill a "gook" than to kill a Vietnamese civilian) (Mueller 
1969, 33). The hero, in contrast, may emerge as "charismatic leader" 
attributed with "... formative power for initiating, creating, 
governing, transforming, or destroying what is vital to man's life" 
(Shils 1975, 258).
Such conflict dynamics, then, tend to reinforce old images, distort 
and filter new information incompatible with old values, and thus impair 
learning and development. In the struggle between cultures, or between 
two power centers, both lose the ability to learn from each other. This 
situation may occur between modernizing (westernizing) Third World 
Nations, and the West. Social change alone may create
13
dissonance--because it challenges old values, views and methods. 
"Reinforced" by a threat system, however, the process becomes self 
defeating. As Boulding notes:
The dialectical struggles, let us say, between 
Christianity and Islam, between Catholicism and 
Protestantism, between Capitalism and Communism, are 
not essentially part of the knowledge process but
are essentially part of the threat system (1970,
62).
The exponents of religious or ideological systems often find support 
among 'princes' who wish to legitimate their own counter-threat system 
to some rival center of power.
In addition, dialectical views of the world, such as Marxism, 
Fascism, racism, militarism, and nationalism, place high value on 
conflict and subscribe to the idea of "defeating the enemy." Rate of
conflict, that is, "the ratio of gain of the winning party to the loss
of the losing party," is high, in the presence of strong dialectical 
elements (Boulding 1970, 52). Because of the spiraling toxicity of the 
conflictual exchange, the overall welfare of the entire system tends to 
diminish. This happens, for example, when the Communists take over the 
Capitalists. Processes of this kind are "terribly costly." And the new 
"stability" is precarious, at best. Boulding considers dialectical 
processes in history as retrogressive, and as symptoms of disease rather 
than health.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS GOAL AND APPROACH
... all the world over and at all times there have 
been practical men, absorbed in 'irreducible and 
stubborn facts': all the world over and at all
times there have been men of philosophic temperament 
who have been absorbed in the weaving of general 
principles. It is this union of passionate interest 
in the detailed facts with equal devotion to 
abstract generalization which forms the novelty in 
our present society (Whitehead, qtd. in Miller 
1978, 6).
Accordingly, the framework outlined above furthers the "weaving of 
general principles" by serving as template for historical facts.
Instead of linear cause and effect, the focus is on movement, that is, 
on process within and among relationship systems, pivoting on one or 
another organizing principle--where the unit of analysis is social 
organization. Distance and legitimacy are important variables, and will 
receive attention in relation to social organization and change. Within 
this context, I will address the following in relation to each other:
1) Shi'ism, as integrative system with a history of opposition to 
the regime in power, as revitalization movement, and as apparent 
contemporary "solution" for the Iranian people, including diverse 
political and social groups;
2) the nature of the regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi--where 
the threat system seemingly overshadowed the integrative and the 
exchange system;
3) the major variables and relationships that contributed to the
explosive climate in Iran, such as distance and legitimacy;
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4) the of role Khomeini in light of established principles and 
practices of Shi'ism, as voice of the opposition, as charismatic leader, 
and as "prince who legitimates his own threat system."
In this sense, the framework will serve my case study as context 
for description of process, and illuminate the complexities, that is, 
the patterns, issues and themes underlying the Iranian Revolution and 
show how those were expressed. The examples I will use are meant to be 
illustrative, and provide plausible connections rather than demonstrate 
incontrovertible theory. To facilitate "verstehen" of reality from the 
perspective of particular participants, description will include viewing 
the world through the lens of the major actors and groups involved in 
the dynamics that gave rise to violent change in Iran. In this sense, 
the study will have both, objective and subjective dimensions, and thus, 
structural and interpretive elements. I will rely on primary sources by 
politicians who were involved in the shaping of history, and on 
secondary sources by social scientists, historians, and journalists.
(See "Bibliography.")
ISLAM EMERGES: AN INTEGRATIVE SYSTEM IN THE CONTEXT OF
SOCIAL CHANGE AND CONFLICT--A REVITALIZATION MOVEMENT7
Islam began in Mecca in 610 A.D. with the public preachments of 
Muhammad, a native of Mecca. His rise to public life occurred against a 
background of social and economic change, namely, from nomadic 
pastoralism to commerce. This process was associated with the weakening 
of kinship ties, and with emphasis on locality and exchange as 
organizing principles. It also gave rise to economic and political
16
monopolists. Muhammad claimed to have been sent by God to guide 
humanity. He beckoned Meccans to worship, and brought warnings of 
penalties for disobedience. His message included reminders of social 
obligations toward the lesser privileged. Generally, the religious 
proclamations of Muhammad addressed the growing social malaise of Mecca, 
and might be viewed as voice of the opposition (Watt 1980, 4).
Perceived as threatening by some of the monopolists, he found his 
freedom of speech curtailed, and his message largely rejected by 
Meccans. With seventy of his followers he migrated to Medina, an oasis 
about 200 miles north of Mecca, in 622 A. D. It became the date of 
beginning of the Islamic calendar. The followers of Muhammad, mostly 
young men, came from the following three groups: 1) opponents of
monopolistic policies in Mecca; 2) those impoverished by monopolistic 
practices; and 3) outsiders without clan protection (Watt 1961, 12).
Hostile nomadic clans had been able to avoid blood-feuding by 
avoiding each others' migratory routes. Having recently settled in 
Medina, however, they suddenly found themselves within striking distance 
of each other. This potentially explosive situation provided fertile 
ground for the emergence of a strong leader. The Medinans found him in 
Muhammad--whose message promised relief from social troubles, in spite 
of its Meccan overtones.
Once the tribes had come together under the 
leadership of Muhammad, they felt the influence of 
their members and recognized also that it was Islam 
that had brought an inspiring unity of purpose to 
tribes accustomed to war upon another (Donaldson 
1933, xxi).
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Muhammad called his new community umma. In contrast to individual and 
group pride as moral orientation, the new moral tone pervading the 
community was based on the "... individual's relationship to God, but 
maintained ... by the expectations prevalent in the group as a whole 
and given form in their corporate life" (Hodgson 1974, 1: 173). Three
new fundamental questions faced believers. Namely, "how to live 
correctly, how to think correctly, and how to organize correctly" (Von 
Grunebaum in von Grunebaum 1955, 21). Heathen ambitions of wealth, 
power, and fame, remain acceptable only to the extent they are 
integrated into the new organizational structure of life under Islam.
Moreover, as arbitrator and judge for the feuding tribes, Muhammad 
gradually gained political authority. Out of this relationship grew a 
new body politic with the "... scope for realizing the political 
potentialities of the Qur'anic ideas" (Watt 1980, 4). Also, Muhammad 
ultimately gained control over Mecca, and developed ties with many of 
the tribes of Arabia. Muhammad "brought them something of a world 
vision. He called them to monotheism and gave them an intelligible 
relationship between themselves and other monotheistic peoples" 
(Donaldson 1933, xxi). Thus, by the time of his death in 632 A.D., an 
Islamic state existed, however, without defined geographical boundaries. 
Only the abstracted boundary of a belief and integrative system, Islam, 
defined the state. Muhammad had been the religious and political 
leader, and military commander of this state. In ca. 642 A.D. 
invading Arab armies brought Islam to Iran. By ca. 800 A.D, the 
majority of the population had been converted to Islam (Area Handbook of 
Iran 1978, xii).
The message of Muhammad, the revelations to him from God, are
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permanently embodied in the Koran. Every Muslim must know them 
intimately. The reports of the doings and sayings of the prophet, the 
hadiths, represent another form of authority. On the basis of both, the 
ulama, the learned men of Islam and religious leaders, have elaborated 
how Muslims ought to live. The rules became the shari'a, the law of 
Islam. "In principle it covers every possible human contingency, social 
and individual, from birth to death" (Hodgson 1974, 1: 74).
SHI'ISM IS BORN:
AN INTEGRATIVE SYSTEM IN OPPOSITION TO THE RULING GROUP 
A REVITALIZATION MOVEMENT
Shi'at Ali (the party of Ali), commonly known as Shi'a, emerged as 
faction in opposition to Sunnis, the group in power, and then developed 
into a separate religious movement. That is to say, only secondly did 
Shi'is also "claim a distinct vision of religious truth" (Pipes in 
Curtis 1981, 365). Rather, the split revolved around issues of 
authority and legitimate successorship of their leaders. Problems of 
authority and questions of legitimacy are recurring themes in Iranian 
history. It has been argued, that because of this legacy, Shi'ism 
provides a "sharper cutting edge for social protest and political 
activism" (Akhavi in Pullapily 1980, 189).
To elaborate, Muhammad's sons all died during childhood. Fatima, 
who married Ali, was Muhammad's only daughter to give him male heirs, 
two boys, Hasan and Husayn. According to Shi'i account, after 
Muhammad's death, leadership should have passed to Ali, said to have 
been with the Prophet at his last breath, and designated by him as
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successor (Fischer 1980, 13-14). Stated in Muhammad's own words, 
"Whoever recognises me as master, mawla, will know Ali as his master" 
(Otd. in Donaldson 1933, I). Without a leader to interpret their 
system of religion and exercise political authority in the tradition of 
Muhammad, the prospect of the various tribes holding together was 
minimal (Donaldson 1933, xxiii). The question of legitimate 
successorship quickly allowed old inter-tribal conflicts to surface. 
Thus, during the burial ceremony, instead of mourning Muhammad, Abu
Bakr, the father-in-law of the Prophet, and Umar, another close
associate, held an election. They chose Abu Bakr to succeed Muhammad. 
Abu Bakr died two years later; Umar inherited the caliphate. To insure 
a successor of his choice, Umar named an election comittee of six men.
Of the two contenders, Uthman received the caliphate over Ali.
Eventually he was assassinated, and finally succeeded by Ali as fourth 
caliph. "Ali was the true Amin'1-Muminin, or Commander of the Faithful, 
and as such should have been recognized as the immediate successor of 
the Apostle of God" (Donaldson 1933, 14). In the eyes of the Shi'a, the 
other three caliphs were usurpers. Only Ali had the "special 
authority," acquired through his closeness to Muhammad, to lead the 
community of the Prophet (Hodgson 1974, 1: 372). Accordingly, the
Shi'a pledged their allegiance to the descendants of "Ali in the male 
line" whom they called Imams. From their perspective, Ali immediately 
began "to put the house of Islam in order" (Fischer 1980, 15).
As a matter of principle, then, Shi'is insisted on a ruler who "..
ruled by a kind of divine right and not as a nominee of the people"
(Watt 1961, 104). Wherever a Shi'i group surfaced, it had a leader 
(Pipes in Curtis 1981, 364-365; Lewis 1973). The Shi'i movement was a
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group of people who found meaning and security in following a 
"charismatic leader" (Sunderland in Fischer 1968, 674). As Shils 
observes fittingly, "the disposition to attribute charisma is directly 
related to the need for order" (1975, 263). Both, great capacity for 
violence, that is to say, "order destroying power" with the promise of 
greater harmony in the future, or "order creating, diclosing or 
discovering power" can attract attribution of charisma (Shils 1975).
Ali, however, met with the same fate as had his predecessor; he 
was assassinated "on the nineteenth day of Ramadam A.H. 40 while 
praying in the mosque of Kufa." The Shi*a still hold him in high esteem 
today. They admire him for his many virtues, and particularly for going 
to his death in spite of knowing he would be murdered, and for treating 
his future assassin kindly.
Again, the successorship left the direct line of the Prophet and 
went to Mu'awiya, over the politically weak Hasan, Ali's older son. 
Mu'awiya had Hasan poisoned, in an effort to ensure the caliphate to his 
own son, Yazid. When Yazid eventually gained leadership, Husayn, Ali's 
younger son, refused to recognize him in that role. He consequently 
sealed his own fate; on his way to Kufa where his father had been 
assassinated, Yazid and his men intercepted Husayn, and forced him to 
camp in the desert of Karbala. After ten days, Husayn and all the men 
of his party were slain; women and children were taken prisoners. 
Because this martyrdom occurred on Friday noon, the time of communal 
prayer, the act had even graver implications. Out of the schism among 
the believers grew a distinct form of Islam, namely, Shi'ism. The basic 
difference then, between the Sunni and the Shi'i Sect of Isam, is that 
"... to Sunnis Abu Bakr, Umar and Mu'awiya are good caliphs, men
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without whom the survival of Islam would have to be questioned" (Fischer 
1980, 21). Conversely, to Shi'is, these men perverted Islam. By 
following them, and abandoning Ali, Muslims had abandoned "the truth" 
(Hodgson 1974, I: 372). Shi'is refuse to recognize them as Imams.
Because of them, Islam had been unable to "fulfill its promise as just 
social system."
THE ELABORATION OF IRANIAN SHI'ISM AS INTEGRATIVE SYSTEM 
IN THE CONTEXT OF THREAT
Following the murders of Ali and Husayn, their disciples, a 
minority amongst Sunnis, were fiercly persecuted. In this context,
Jafar al-Sadiq, the sixth Imam in the line of Ali, allegedly instituted 
the principle of the Imamate, and hence divorced religious authority 
from political rule; until God would decide otherwise. The Umayyad 
caliphs, victoriously ruling the Arab empire from their capitol of 
Damascus tested people to detect Shi'is, by insulting Ali and his 
followers. Those unable to pass the test were put to death. Shi'is 
thus adopted the principle of taqiyya (dissimulation of their true 
beliefs) in an effort to escape this fate. This principle states, "... 
it is legitimate to dissemble if one is in the hands of an enemy, or 
believes with reason that one's life is threatened" (Heikal 1981, 87). 
Al-Sadiq advised believers to fear for their religion, "and to protect 
if with taqiyya, for there is no faith when there is no taqiyya" (Jafri, 
qtd. in Bayat 1982, 4). Simultaneously, he declared the political 
function of the Imam, "to wage holy war for the establishment of justice 
and equity on earth," postponed, and requested his followers to refrain
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from challenging political authority. At the same time, dissimulation 
fostered the tendency "to form closed and often secret bodies of the 
elect" (Hodgson 1974, 2: 198).
Thus, Shi1ism gradually developed its own form of piety, and its 
own variants of the Shari'a (Hodgson 1974, 2: 372). During the eighth
and ninth century, in reaction to challenges of orthodox Shi'i views, 
the ulama gained their own corporate identity. Although their origin 
dates back to the early period of Islam, as guardians of the words of 
Allah, and as controllers of public worship--it was during this time, 
the Shi1a ulama established a separate school of theology and 
jurisprudence. Kufa in Iraq, Qum in Iran, and Aleppo in Syria came 
under Shi’i influence (Akhavi 1980, 5). They still principally 
distinguished themselves through their insistence that spiritual 
leadership succeeded through Ali, in the series of twelve Imams (Wilber 
1981, 82-3; Bayat 1982, 5). After the death of al-Sadiq in 765 A.D., 
most of his followers paid allegiance to his son Musa al-Kazim, as 
seventh Imam. The succession ends with Muhammad al-Mahdi as twelfth 
Imam, in 874 A.D. (An activist Shi’i splinter group formed in 765 A.D., 
following al-Sadiq’s other son Ismail, as seventh and last Imam. They 
are called Ismailis or Seveners). According to Shi’i creed, each of the 
twelve Imams is said to have had devine infallibility, each could work 
miracles, each named his own successor, and each--except the twelfth 
Imam--met with death by violence (Wilber 1981, 83). The twelth, or 
Hidden Imam went into hiding (occultation) in a cave, and will 
eventually return as Mahdi when the world approaches its end. Because 
of this legacy, Iranian Shi’is are also known as Imami or Twelver Sect 
(Akhavi 1980, 6). While the title al-Mahdi originally merely designated
23
the "ideal Islamic ruler"--with the introduction of the occultation, 
coupled with the promise of the return "of the future restorer of 
justice" the title gained "eschatological tones in Imami Shi'ism" 
(Sachedina 1981, 68-9).
For about seventy years, from 874 until 940 A.D., a series of four 
vakils (deputies) represented the Hidden Imam on earth. This period is 
known as Lesser Occultation. The last of the four vakils died without 
designating a successor, "leaving the matter in the hands of God." 
(Earliest prophecy held the Mahdi would return after seventy years).
The Shi'a, left without a leader, decided after lengthy deliberation, 
that the mujtahids should represent the Hidden Imam on earth, until his 
return. These events ushered in the period of Greater Occultation 
(Savory in Curtis 1981, 133). It was a time of hardship for the 
Shi'is --because it became increasingly obvious to them that the 
appearance of the Mahdi "in the near future" was uncertain. They "were 
being tested and sifted and purified, until the matter became clear for 
them; this will apparently occur with the appearance of the Imam" 
(Sachedina 1981, 100). Also beginning at ca. 800 A.D., Iranian 
Nationalism gained expression through growing adherence to Shi'ism (Area 
Hanbook of Iran 1978, xii). Shi'ism thus continued to serve as 
integrative system in opposition to other groups.
According to historical records, the Shi'a had remained discreet in 
opposing temporal rule, and had refrained from participating in 
politics, during the lifetime of the twelve Imams, with the exception of 
the eighth Imam, Ali Reza. The Sunni Caliph Ma'mun designated Imam Ali 
Reza as heir apparent to the caliphate, and summoned him to the far away 
Merv. Ma'mun had been strongly influenced by his vizier, Fadl ibn Sahl,
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known as sympathetic to Persians and Shi'is. "... [A]s a master stroke 
of diplomacy, in his opinion, he arrived at the decision to attempt to 
conciliate the Shi'ites by designating their Imam as his successor to 
the Caliphate" (Donaldson 1933, 163). The Imam took great pains to 
explain he had no choice but to obey. In contrast to his last three 
predecessors, he thus became involved in politics, by accepting the 
nomination to the calipahte. In the process, according to Shi'i 
account, his enemies poisoned him. He is buried in Mashad. Shi'is 
maintain, Ali Reza had been forced to accept the proposal of Caliph 
Ma'mun--although he had strongly expressed his preference to stay out of 
all secular administrative duties (Donaldson 1933, 161-9).
The Shi'a worship Imams as martyrs and make pilgrimages to Mecca, 
to Karbala, to Najaf in Iraq, to Mashad to the Shrine of Aliz Reza, the 
eigth Imam, and to the Shrine of Fatima, the "pure one" in Qum. Most of 
their numerous holidays are intensely sad occasions. They occur 
according to the lunar calendar of Islam. One particularly 
intense mourning period, during the month of Muharram, marks the tragedy 
Karbala, remembered in sermons, flagellations and tragic plays. These 
climax on Ashura, the 10th of Muharram. Mourners slash themselves with 
knives and whip themselves with chains, "to demonstrate the overwhelming 
nature of their grief" (Savory in Curtis 1981, 133). The reenactment of 
the martyrdom of Husayn through passion plays has a particularly 
catharctic effect.
What rains down? Blood! Who? The Eye! How? Day 
and Night! Why? From grief! What grief? The 
grief of the Monarch of Karbala! What was his name?
Husayn! of (sic) Whose race? Ali's! Who was his
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mother? Fatima! Who was his grandsire? Mustafa!
How was it with him? He fell a martyr! Where? In
the Plain of Mariya! When? On the 10th of
Muharram! Secretly? No, in public! Was he slain 
by night? No, by day! At what time? Noontide!
Was his head severed from his throat? No, from the 
nape of the neck! Was he slain unthirsting? No!
Did none give him to drink? They did! Who? Shimr!
From what source? From the source of death (Savory 
in Curtis 1981, 133)!
During these rituals, the villain image of Yazid may serve the functions 
postulated by Klapp, namely: 1)sustain moral vigilance; 2)prepare for
the "affirmative entrance and service of the hero"; 3)serve as reminder 
of "what kind of people are to be feared, and of the nature of evil" 
(Klapp 1973; 1978, 83, 91,94). In this sense, use of the Karbala
symbolism may become a manipulative force. It would be often used by 
Khomeini in relation to the Shah and to the United States Government.
In the eyes of believers, the Shah became '"the Yazid of the age,'"
(Algar in Keddie 1972, 233). As Minorsky asserts, "Even up to our day,
Shi'ism with its overtones and its aroma of opposition, of martyrdom, 
and of revolt, is matched quite well with the Persian character--a 
character formed in the course of a long history which is very different 
from the history of other peoples nearby" (In von Grunebaum 1955, 201). 
In light of this history, according to Fischer, the various expressions 
of Shi'ism "can be viewed as cultural forms composed of symbolic 
structure" (1980, 4).
For centuries then, Shi'ism has pervaded public and private life.
As a way of life, it lends context and meaning, serving as lens through 
which believers view the world. The hadith within th Qu'ran, the 
traditions of the Imams, and the interpretations of their spiritual 
heirs, the Shi'a ulama, offer all sources of knowledge and guidance for
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behavior. The shar'ia (religious law) offered the sole legal code for 
most of these centuries. For believers, the following holds:
Islam is based on knowledge and is not separated 
from it.... Therefore, if science progresses it 
cannot affect the laws of Islam... because no 
knowledge can be higher than God's and in Islam all 
knowledge comes from God (Thaiss in Yar-Shater 1971,
192) .
Contemporarily, four main styles of Shi'ism can be identified, 
namely: 1) the religion of the masses populating the villages; 2) the
religion of the madrasas or colleges that train religious leaders; 3) 
Sufism, a "mystical counterculture"; and 4) the more private, "ethical" 
religion of the upper classes. Some have argued there is a fifth style, 
a combination of the second and fourth, that became the ideology of the 
revolution (Fischer 1980, 4). Defense of faith occurs on three levels, 
the popular, the political, and the scholarly (Fischer 1980, 32). At 
the popular level, the bazaaris represent an invaluable mobilizing 
force--because they are both a business organization and a "web of 
social communication."
The madrasas have been the central agent in the "cultural 
involution" of Shi'ism since the sixteenth century by maintaining and 
elaborating a symbolic world (Fischer 1980, 32). Education at the 
madrasas takes place in the hawza (circle); that is, disciples collect 
around a teacher and internalize his interpretations and connotations. 
Students choose their own teachers and develop strong bonds of respect 
for and devotion to them. Teaching rests on the dialectic principle of 
argument and counterargument. There are no grades. Students proceed at 
their own speed. "For each there is a place according to his capacity
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and inclination: a village preacher (akhund) need not be a legal expert
(mujtahid)" (Fischer 1980, 61). Fischer noted there are limits to 
debate with students for the following reasons: 1) their "conscious
limit of knowledge and a forced reliance on authority figures who 
presumably know more"; 2) their belief that certain things are 
questionable and others are explicable only through traditional 
procedures; and 3) "the force of dramatic aesthetic" that revolves 
"around the lives of the three first imams in particular." There is 
strong resistance toward anything that might reduce the dramatic impact 
of these stories (Fischer 1980, 75-6).
Scholarly hierarchy consists of six levels. The entry level is 
that of the talib ilm (learner). Upon graduation he becomes a muthahid 
(someone who has exerted himself so as to be able to frame an opinion). 
Based on the criteria of learning and piety, believers may choose him as 
marja-i taqlid (source of imitation and supreme authority on law) (Algar 
in Keddie 1972, 235; Fischer in Esposito 1983, 153). The third level 
is that of mubelleg-al-risala (carrier of the message). Fourth is the 
level of hojat al Islam (authority of Islam). At this level, the 
student may form his own hawza. The more followers he gathers, the 
closer he comes to attaining the fifth level, that of the ayatollah 
(sign of God). The ultimate level is the sixth level that of the 
ayatollah al-uzma (great sign of God). Anyone at this level personifies 
the margieieh (the individual to be referred to on everything) (Heikal 
1981, 83). To attain this grade, the candidate must be accepted by 
members already in the grade, and must be able to offer them a 
theological treatise "of sufficient merit." Khomeini advanced to this 
level with a treatise entitled "Tahrir al-Wasilah" (The Liberation of
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the Means). Because the number five has special meaning for 
Moslems--there are only five ayatollahs al-uzma at any one time.^
Based on the Persian constitution of 1906 they cannot be arrested. 
Consequently, after Khomeini advanced to that level, the Shah could no 
longer arrest him, and exiled him instead (Heikal 1981, 83).
The geographical location of the madrasas, and related dynamics, 
further emphasize their centrality. Madrasas tend to be attached to 
major mosques, many of which encircle the bazaar, at the old core of 
most cities. Behind this configuration lies the "major bulwark of Shi'i 
Islam." To elaborate, mosques, in contrast to churches, consist mainly 
of open courtyards that serve as gathering places. People go there in 
large numbers to "pray, walk, discuss, meditate, listen, hold 
meetings--breathe" (Kapuscinski 1985, 76). Much of the bazaar 
constitutes the waqf (endowment) for the religious institutions. An 
estimateed 80 percent of the clergy's income, and much of the financial 
support for the madrasas, comes from the bazaar. (Koranic doctrine also 
entitles religious teachers to one fifth of the income of his hawza) 
(Heikal 1982, 84). In turn, the bazaaris conduct business within the 
framework of the Islamic order, elaborated by the clergy in terms of 
interpretations of economic morality and law. The bazaaris also 
"supplement and complement the function of the mullahs" through 
organized missions (hey'at), "each in charge of religious gathering 
places other than mosques" (Zabih 1979, 29). Hey'ats complement guilds 
and represent a cross-section of the bazaar community (Spooner in 
Yar-Shater 1971, 170-3). Passion plays take place at Taaziyeh, one such 
site. Hosseinyeh, another site serves as center for mourning the dead, 
and Mahdiyeh for religious instruction and recital of the Koran.
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Bazaaris also organize thousands of pilgrimages and appoint leaders for 
the major processions in the Islamic calender, the most important being 
Ashura. Submission to the leadership of these bazaaris, reputed to be 
pious and wise, occurs through informal means. For instance, any 
bazaari denied the endorsement of the leader, may as well close his 
shop. Business will decline dramatically. At the same time, 
intermarriage and parochial association maintain solidarity.
In addition, bazaaris provide links to many other social strata. 
They maintain ties with peasants by trading agricultural surplus for 
consumer goods; also, their families yield many teachers, tradesmen, 
lawyers, journalists, technocrats, and middle ranking military 
personnel. During the constitutional movement (1905-1911), and later, 
during the revolution (1977-1979), this symbiosis between the bazaaris 
and their entire network, on the one hand, and the ulama, on the other 
hand, represented a powerful anti-government force.
In modern times, there has been a continual dialogue 
between the bazaar and the regime. The shah was one 
of the main foci of foreign influence in the 
society; the bazaar is xenophobic, explicitly in 
the interests of conservative interpretation of the 
traditional religion. The religious class provides 
the main spokesmen of the bazaar, and so the 
religious idiom of social action in the bazaar is 
further reinforced (Spooner in Yar-Shater 1971,
171) .
Moreover, the corporateness and social organization of the bazaar 
constituted the pillar that rendered the Iranian ulama in many respects 
sui generis (Zabih 1979, 27-32; Akhavi in Pullapilly 1980, 189; Bonine 
in Bonine and Keddie 1981, 233- 58). Their independent financial status 
also differentiates them in a concrete way from their Sunni
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counterparts --who receive their income through the state (Heikal 1982, 
83-4).
SHI1ISM CONTINUES AS INTEGRATIVE SYSTEM IN THE FACE OF THREAT
In contrast to Sunni states where in the name of unity of the 
Islamic state caliphs condoned the usurption of their military and 
political power by amirs or sultans, preferring even despotism to 
anarchy--the ulama of Iran have been trying to maintain the units of 
politics and religion in the face of the disappearance of the Imam and 
the establishment of a temporal government (Akhavi 1980, 15; Savory in 
Curtis 1981, 130-31). They have never retracted the assertion that only 
the Imam is legitimately entitled to rule, and have consistently 
regarded the caliphate as symbol of oppression and injustice (Bayat 
1982, 5). Until the reappearance of the Imam, the mujtahids interpret 
the Koran for the umma. In this sense, temporal rule could be 
considered tolerable as long as it defers to religious advice and to the 
injunctions of the mujtahids. Interestingly, the revolutionaries of 
1977-1979 apply the term Imam to Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini.
Temporal authorities, on the other hand, have in various ways tried 
to undermine the power of the ulama. Under the more centralized 
government of Shah Ismail Safavi, however, Imami Shi'ism "burst on the 
scene" in 1501/02 as a "millenarian charismatic movement," and became 
the state religion of Iran (Akhavi 1980, 6). The dynasty offered 
Shi'ism as integrative system, to a peoples devastated by years of war, 
anarchy, and disintegration. They formed a united front in opposition 
to Sunni rule. In this way the Shi'i religious order gave rise to a
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routinized administration in opposition to the Sunni Ottoman Empire 
which constituted the main threat to the country. Through annexation of 
vast areas some of the Shi'i shrines, together with their endowments, 
came under Shi'i control. The position of the mullabashi (chief mullah) 
came into existence. '"... some sources suggest the direct religious 
rule by means of concourse of mujtahids above the monarch'" (Savory in 
Curtis 1981, 135). During this marriage, the state declined in 
political, military, and economic power--while the religious order 
"exaggerated the status of the religious learned class." This 
reenforced the doctrine that only the Imam is entitled to rule. Until 
the return of the twelfth Imam, "dynasties simply hold the fort"
(Spooner in Yar-Shater 1971, 171). Then, in the eighteenth century, 
Nadir Shah once again weakened Shi'i hierarchy by abolishing core 
positions (Donaldson 1933, 60-2).
It was later, under the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925) that the ulama 
regained a stronger position under conditions that seemed to threaten 
Iranian sovereignty and separate identity. Namely, the Qajars became 
associated with Westernization. Foreigners seemed to violate the 
boundaries of Iran. Muhammad Shah (1834-1848), like Mohammed Reza 
Pahlavi 130 years later, received the designation of "'the Yazid of the 
age.'" Rumors also circulated connecting the Qajars with the Umayyads, 
and thus with the slaughter at Karbala. These rumors became more 
intense during the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911). From their 
center in Najaf, located in Ottoman territory, and therefore outside of 
the political influence of the Qajar empire, the ulama "began to 
reassert its authority" (Donaldson 1933, 63). Certain factions of the 
clergy increasingly committed themselves to participation in the
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strictly political realm, and eventually openly agitated against the 
dynasty's claim to govern. They expressed opposition through 
constitional protest, and through direct involvement in demonstrations, 
strikes and other measures. Consistent with their xenophobia and their 
struggle over sovereignty, they issued their first open protest in 1891 
against the British tobacco monopoly, asking "all believers" to cease 
using tobacco. The constitution of 1905-1906 gave "legal expression" to 
the ulama. It replaced the 'urf system, based on the outlook of the 
respective monarch in power, with a civil code, based largely on the 
shari'a. Legislation advanced the clergy into one of the "'ranks'" of 
society. Clergy were elected to parliament. Through a committee to 
"protect" holy law from bad decisions and maintain it, the clergy felt 
they were representing the Imam's and the people's concept of social 
justice at the same time. Within their own ranks the clergy had 
different perceptions of the concept of sovereignty, and were 
consequently divided in some of their responses. One faction viewed 
sovereignty belonging only to Allah, upheld through the clergy--the 
other faction saw sovereignty reposed in the nation. The factions 
finally succeeded in drafting "Article 35 of the Supplementary 
Fundamental Law." It states "Sovereignty is a trust confided (as a 
Divine Gift) by the people to the person of the King" (Akhavi 1980, 27). 
According to Donaldson, this is a "tacit recognition that the hidden 
Imam is the one in ultimate authority" (1933, 63). In 1909, a leading 
religious figure forwarded a constitutional treatise asking the "nations 
religious leaders to play a corrective role in society to amend the 
excesses of political officials by means of right guidance" (Akhavi 
1980, 15).
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As Algar asserts, involvement of the ulama in the Constitutional 
Revolution may partly be taken as a sign that the government had strayed 
too far from the authoritative guidance of the mujtahids. The 
underlying tension had given way to "open rupture" (In Keddie 1972,
235). Keddie, in addition, views lack of centralization in terms of 
geographical conditions, and in terms of ethnic diversity, together with 
"concessions to Westerners," as major contributors to the ulama's 
uprising (Keddie 1972, 25-6). Seemingly then, Shi'ism, and its 
structure of religious authority once again facilitated the "closing of 
the system" in an attempt to restore predictability and integration, 
this time in open opposition to the government. Opposition expressed 
itself in religious terms and metaphors with symbolic meaning. As in 
the early days of Islam, the abstracted boundary of a belief system 
substituted for lack of a defined, concrete boundary of the state. 
Religion and ritual, therefore, are processes in "dynamic interaction 
(equilibration) with a changing environment" (d'Aquili, et al 1979,
312) .
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY: 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW THREAT SYSTEM
In spite of its declaration of neutrality, Russian and British 
troops invaded Iran shortly after the outbreak of World War I. Major 
Iranian cities became pivotal points of espionage for Russian, German, 
and British agents. Turkish and Russian troops fought each other on 
Iranian soil. These destructive forces intensified internal anarchic 
conditions, the result of weak leadership by Ahmad Shah. For example,
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peasants suffered from extortions by landlords because of the complete 
absence of central authority. Thus, while Iran was experiencing 
internal upheaval, dislocations also affecting Iran, were occurring on 
the international scene. It was an interlude "dominated by 'power of 
foreigners, the bad example of greedy leaders, the breakdown of the 
religious institution and morality it should have upheld'" (Akhavi 1980, 
25). Because of the Russian Revolution of 1917, Russia withdrew most of 
its forces from Iran. The British remained the only dominant power in 
Iran, and drew up a treaty with the intent of placing Iran completely 
under British control. Then, a revolt in Iraq caused security problems 
for the British in the region of the Persian Gulf. Perceiving weakness, 
and succumbing to popular pressure, the Iranian Majlis repudiated the 
Treaty of Alliance with the United Kingdom. As anarchic conditions 
continued, Iran signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 
1921.
On February 21, 1921, Colonel Reza Khan, the father of Shah 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, backed the Iranaian journalist Sayyid Zia Din 
Tabatabai in a bloodless military coup d'etat with the forces of a 
Persian Cossak Brigade. Three months later, upon the departure of 
Tabatabai, Colonel Reza Khan, the minister of war and commander in chief 
of the army, came to dominate the history of Iran between World War I 
and World War II (Area Handbook of Iran 1978, 52-53; Preece 1979, 3-8). 
He aimed to accomplish the following: 1) establish order; 2) promote
his own career; 3) free Iran from external control; and 4) modernize 
the country (Akhavi 1980, 27). As Reza Pahlavi, he consolidated power 
over the military and over political positions. In addition to the 
military as his power base, he enjoyed civilian support through segments
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of the following four political parties: 1) the conservatives of the
Reformers party (Hizb-i Eslah Taleban); 2) the reformers of the Revival
party (Hizb-i Tajadod); 3) the radicals of the Socialist party (Hizb-i 
Sosiyalist); and 4) the revolutionaries of the Communist party 
(Abarahamian 1982, 120). In 1923, he took the office of Prime Minister. 
In 1925, he convened a Constituent Assembly to despose the Qajar Dynas ty 
(1796-1925) and ascended to the imperial throne. "In April of the 
following year, wearing a military uniform and the royal jewels, he 
crowned himself, in the style of his hero Napoleon, the Shah-in-Shah of 
Iran" (Abrahamian 1982, 120).
Shah Reza's legacy emerged as deeply antithetical to the ulama, and 
to religious tradition. In the early 1920s, he had attempted to develop 
relations with the ulama to win political power; after his coronation 
ceremony in 1925, however, he discontinued these relations and pursued 
secularization of society. In the course of this pursuit, distance 
between him and the majority of the Iranian people grew. "... the 
impact of secularization is mainly associated with him, a fact that time 
and again emerges in discussions with Iranians of the older generation" 
(Akhavi 1980, xvi). Namely, by 1930 under Reza Shah, the power of the 
ulama in the field of law had been eroded, beginning with the 
dismantling of the shar (religious courts) in 1926. As Faghfoory 
observed:
Whereas the 'ulama* constituted forty percent of the 
deputies in the Sixth Majlis (1926-1928), and around 
thirty percent in the Seventh (1930-1932), the 
Eleventh Majlis which met in 1937 did not include 
even a single well-known and important figure from 
the ulama (qtd. in Akhavi 1980, 59).
36
Civil and criminal codes based on French law replaced the shari'a 
(Preece 1979, 5). Also in 1926, the government of Iran instituted 
conscription law that allowed the state to decide over exemption from 
military duty in the newly established, rapidly growing, national army. 
Consequently, the state could draft, and hence control, members of the 
ulama perceived as threatening to the regime. Reza Shah further 
outlawed passion plays, thus eliminating an important catharctic outlet, 
and began massive campaigns persuading people to dress like Europeans.
He ordered men to wear brimmed hats, instead of their brimless ones. 
Brimmed hats prevented them from touching the ground with their 
foreheads in prayer. He banned chadors--the police tore them off the 
terrified women in the streets (Kapuscinski 1985, 22). One eyewitness 
reported:
I was in time to see police tearing silken scarves 
from the women's heads and handing them back in 
ribbons to their owners; for anything even remotely 
resembling a veil was forbidden.... It was not the 
men who wished their women to be veiled so much as 
the women themselves who clung modestly to the old 
customs (qtd. in Arasteh 1970, 105).
When the faithful protested, as in Meshed in 1935-1936, calling on Imam 
Husayn to protect them from the "evil Shah"--he sent in the army to 
quiet them. He resorted to military force after city policemen had 
refused to violate the sanctity of the shrine. City officials rushed 
about with their European hats hidden under their jackets, producing 
them only as they passed each other. Arrests, flogging and deaths 
resulted from the crackdown. The British Consul noted that although
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"the prompt display of military force certainly deterred the opposition, 
the bloodshed served to widen the gulf between the shah and the country" 
(Abrahamian 1982, 152). The monarch's wife and daughter appeared 
unveiled in public. In this connection, Reza Shah personally beat a 
mullah with a cane in one of the mosques of Qum, for speaking out 
against the incident.
Reza Shah also placed severe restrictions on religious education, 
one of the strongholds of the ulama. For instance, under him, 
legislation was passed dictating examination and licensing of religious 
teachers; and the faculty of Theology was established as "one of four 
constitutive colleges" at Tehran University, as direct challenge to the 
influence of the madrasas. He "emasculated" the power base of the ulama 
by keeping guilds and bazaaris under strict governmental control.
Police officers had to be present at guild meetings (Arasteh 1970, 104). 
He destroyed parts of main bazaars by building broad avenues in the 
context of his modernization program (Bonine in Bonine and Keddie 1981, 
235). In addition, Shah Reza stripped deputies of their parliamentary 
immunity, closed down newspapers, walled up protesting liberals in 
towers, and ordered settlement of the nomadic tribes. In response to 
their protest, he had their wells poisoned. Thus, through formal and 
informal harassment, he succeeded to intimidate the ulama and other 
groups (Akhavi 1980, Kapuscinski 1985). The traditional middle class, 
and most of the clergy grew to hate him intensely. The older generation 
of intelligentsia also gradually withdrew their support--while their 
younger counterparts practiced passive opposition (Abrahamian 1982,
153) .
Although Reza Khan never outgrew many of his habits from his
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village childhood or his time in a military barracks, still sleeping on 
the floor and eating from the same pot with his soldiers --his despotic 
rule, and his greed for money and power, overshadowed more humble 
dimensions. He was always in uniform; and, coveting land and money, he 
accumulated massive wealth. Under his rule legislation passed to 
strengthen the position of the landed group. The wealthy gained the 
right to claim land to which peasants held old titles, and became able 
to declare whole villages as private property. The Shah himself became 
the largest landowner, and claimed 3,000 villages and 250,000 peasants 
his own. Medieval methods, however, encouraged low productivity, and 
kept agrarian conditions "backward.” To demonstrate ownership, he even 
ordered the public execution of a donkey that had trespassed onto one of 
his meadows. Neighboring villagers forcibly witnessed the execution 
(Kapuscinski 1985, 23). In addition, the Shah owned stock in factories 
and banks, and continually multiplied his fortune. An authority on Iran 
said this of him:
Paradoxically, the modernization of Persia was 
accomplished by a man who could hardly be called 
cultural--a man who recognized his own limitations 
by insisting that he was just a soldier. Unlike the 
upper-class Persian, he did not feel the spell of 
many centuries of civilization; free of the fetters 
of the past, he could institute reforms and thrust 
obstacles aside with ruthlessness and rude vigor.... 
Reza Shah in a few years eradicated usages and 
practices that had seemed part of the very tissue of 
Persian life. He transformed institutions and 
uprooted convictions which had been held sacred 
(Haas qtd. in Arasteh 1970, 103).
At the same time, in contrast to his son after him, he attempted to 
modernize while eliminating foreign presence, and diminish dependence on
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Britain and on the USSR. He, too, saw the clergy as retrogressive force 
in the context of modernization. Because of his eccentricity, his 
cruelty, and his unresponsiveness to the bulk of the population, 
particularly from his coronation onward--he received little of the 
credit due him for saving Iran from dissolution. In 1941, his 
dictatorial grip succumbed to Allied occupation of Iran. Trying to 
preserve his friendship with Germany finally became his demise. Under 
pressure he went into exile in South Africa. Iran was still poor and 
apathetic. Ecstatic crowds of Iranians celebrated his departure. Reza 
Shah died in exile in 1944.
SUCCESSION OF THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY-- SUCCESSION OF A THREAT SYSTEM
SOCIAL DISTANCE INCREASES
Under chaotic conditions on the national and international scene, 
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi began his turbulent 38 year reign on 
September 16, 1941. In retrospect Hoveyda offers this:
The Shah did not seem very sure of himself in those 
days. His entourage, though deferential, passed 
remarks to him. The ambassador observed protocol 
but treated him rather like a child. Outwardly very 
shy, he listened attentively, and in moments of 
hesitation cast desperate glances toward familiar 
faces (Hoveyda 1980, 125).
Young and inexperienced, he aimed to promote a guided, gradual 
democracy. Nevertheless, he followed in his father's footsteps, and 
aqcuired the image of a despot.
To elaborate, the state under Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (1941-1978) has
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been described as "neopatrimonial form of monarchy, relying heavily on 
built in rivalries, overlapping responsibilities in the bureaucracy and 
secret police terror to concentrate power at the top" (Fischer 1980, 9). 
"Under his rule, Iran saw 24 different prime ministers heading more than 
40 cabinets" (Green 1982, 15). He escaped two official assassination 
attempts. At the same time, the nation "evolved into a complex 
collection of contradictions that have fascinated and confounded 
observers for over 20 years" (Green 1982, xi). His view of the world 
involved leading his country "towards a great civilization"--it was his 
"answer to history" (Pahlavi 1980). His definition of civilization 
seemed to differ dramatically from the definition of many Iranians.
Thus, as will be discussed in the following sections, both, his outlook 
and subsequent method, seemingly alienated the vast majority of his 
people, and apparently left religion as a primary idiom of political 
protest, and as means to integration and illusory safety.
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi inherited his father's legacy together with 
the throne, and with the legitimacy of the monarchy principally 
questioned.
The prestige of the new dynasty was at a low after 
the army failed to react against occupation and 
after Reza Shah accepted abdication. There were 
many individuals and groups who had suffered under 
the heavy handed rule of Reza Shah, and most of 
these looked forward to settling old scores with the 
new Shah (Binder 1980, 9).
Denied real army support (because the military had been "reconstituted 
of non-aristocratic elements by Reza Shah") without legitimacy 
sanctioned by the ulama, with an anarchic, almost independently
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functioning cabinet, and faced with a variety of new political parties, 
including the Marxist oriented Tudeh party, the new Shah tried to 
establish royal authority. In the absence of "love, respect or 
legitimacy," he strove to continue modernization begun by his father 
(Binder 1980, 9).
According to Boulding's postulations of how distance increases in a 
threat system between ruler and ruled--distance had increased with 
succession of the throne from father to son. Thus forced to maneuver 
for support and authority in an hostile environment, exacerbated by the 
political framework of Allied occupation under British dominance, the 
Shah resorted to "compromise, bargaining, favoritism, occasional 
swallowing of pride, indirection, intrigue, and the playing off of 
rivals against each other" (Binder 1980, 9).
During the next twelve years, until the tightening of the 
dictatorship following the Mossadeq interlude in August 1953, power 
struggling continued between the following five separate poles: "the
court, the Majlis, the cabinet, the foreign embassies, and the general 
public" (Abrahamian 1982, 170). Social upheavals, political crises, and 
diplomatic storms continually rocked the country. At the same time, the 
Shah's relation with the ulama was one of tenuous accommodation in need 
of support. Because of the weakened condition of the state, the clergy 
were able to regain some of their influence--until the conflict 
sharpened, eighteen years into the rule of the Shah (Akhavi 1980, 59). 
Nevertheless, the clergy failed to regain control of the country's legal 
and educational system. They also had difficulty uniting either in 
favor of, or against issues in the 1940s and 1950s, which included the 
following: 1) womens suffrage; 2) the clergy's joining political
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parties; 3) the nationalization of the Anglo-American Oil Company 
(AIOC) and the destruction of foreign influence; 4) the subject matter 
published by the press; 5) land laws; 6) communism and leftwing 
challenges (by and large considered identical by the clergy); 7) the
growing autocracy of the Shah; and 8) corruption of the regime (Akhavi 
1980, 63).
To illustrate, the Shah allowed women to return to veils; if they 
chose. It was a "choice" enforced by a fatwa (ruling on religious law), 
signed by fifteen mujtahids, forbidding women to shop unveiled in 
bazaars and markets. Women’s enfranchisement appeared to be one of the 
safer issues--and the ulama largely agreed. They failed to agree, 
however, on joining political parties. Several clergy had run for 
parliament, and served in the majlis. It was against the advice of the 
Qum ulama, and some of their Tehran colleagues. The clergy were also 
divided over nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) 
which occurred in 1951. Oil nationalization partly expressed the 
prevailing anti-foreign sentiments.
Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Mossadeq rose to power and 
ousted the Shah. He presided over oil nationalization by forcing it 
through parliament. Under him, the National Front came into existence 
with three major elements at its core, namely: 1) prominent anti-court
politicians, 2) bazaar-connected politicians, and 3) young, 
western-educated radicals (Abrahamian 1982, 252). They thus represented 
divergent forces that came together in the common struggle for honest 
elections, freedom of the press, nationalization of the oil company 
(owned by the British), and against the court and military complex, 
attracted by the "charismatic personality of Mossadeq" (Abrahamian 1972, .
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252-60). (Some of the anti-Shah elements of 1978-1979 came from these 
three groups). During the brief time in office of Mossadeq in 
1952-1953, Qum, the "Holy City," became the center of clashes between 
political and religious factions. Alarmed over Mossadeq's reliance on 
communist and leftist backing in nationalizing the oil company, most of 
the clergy (a few had cooperated with the left), the bazaaris, and a 
large number of the population supported the Shah in regaining power by 
a coup in 1953. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), also assisted in 
this coup (Preece 1979, 39-41; Rubin 1980, 54-90).
Returning from exile in Rome to reassume the throne, the Shah made 
a religious gesture. He detoured through Iraq and had his picture 
taken, "leaning on the tomb of Ali, patron saint of the Shiites" 
(Kapuscinski 1985, 40). Mossadeq was sent to spend the last ten years 
of his life under house arrest. The regime refrained from stronger 
measures to avoid creating another martyr. At he same time, from 1953 
to 1963, the economic situation in Iran continued to deteriorate. A 
consortium of Western companies, although paying higher prices to Iran 
for oil than before, exploited the oil fields. Corruption and 
incompetence drained the country's revenues and resources. In the 
absence of banks, businessmen felt forced to borrow money from bazaaris 
at prohibitive interest rates. Unemployment increased. Unhealthy real 
estate speculations contributed to the general malaise. A new, rich 
class struggled for power with the feudal landowners. Social and 
political unrest grew (Hoveyda 1980, 131). In the context of these 
events, the ulama increasingly gained self assurance, led by the 
moderate Ayatollah Burujirdi, a marja-i taqlid (source of imitation and 
supreme authority on law of the Shi'a). Burujirdi, in a meeting with
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the clerics in 1949, had urged their withdrawel from politics. He had 
cooperated with the monarchy, particularly during the recovery period 
after World War II, to facilitate stability (Fischer in Esposito 1983, 
153). From his death, in March 1961 on, the relationship between the 
ulama and the regime would deteriorate, however, below the level it had 
been under Reza Shah, and erupt into the religious uprising and the 
subsequent bloody counter-revolution in 1963.
THE THREAT SYSTEM TAKES CENTER STAGE
In the meantime, the removal of Mossadeq, and continuing 
disintegration, ushered in a harsher dictatorship under the Shah. His 
efforts to insure stability and progress, however, only led to growing 
distance between him and the majority of the population. His measures 
included the following: 1) the establishment of National Intelligence
and Security Organization (Sazeman Ettelat va Amniyat Kashvar) SAVAK in 
1957; 2) the land reform bill of 1959, ratified in 1960; and 3) the
White Revolution of 1963.
In 1957 under the guidance of United States and Israeli 
intelligence officers the Shah established SAVAK (Area Handbook of Iran 
1978, 367-74). It "quickly developed into a strong arm of government 
control." It employed an estimated 10,000 full time personnel, and 
200,000 informants (Butler qtd. in Area Handbook of Iran 1978, 373). 
Eventually, the Shah assigned SAVAK to his trusted childhood friend and 
classmate, General Nassiri (executed in 1979) (Rubin 1980, 83). The 
agency became widely reputed for its brutality. Originally, SAVAK 
directed its main force of oppression against the outlawed left-wing
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Tudeh party. It soon branched out into "press censorship and control of 
intellectual expression." Through it, by 1977, the government 
controlled the news media. Citizens were in danger of being arrested 
for owning literature considered subversive by the government. Iranian 
authors found to be writing such literature faced police harassment and 
possible imprisonment, torture or exile.^
The censorship in Iran had always been both brutal 
and stupid. These two adjectives are applicable 
even now, despite the co-option of many former 
intellectuals into the ranks of government censors.
In the old times, if a poet composed anything 
against the established ruler of the city, the 
society, the country, he would be forced to lick the 
ink of the pages of his poem. But this was very 
minor punishment.... During the present Shah's 
reign dozens of writers have been liquidated:...
(Baraheni 1977, 115-16).
Baraheni provides a long list of names of writers and other 
intellectuals who have perished under the current regime. He further 
observes this:
The aims of censorship are too evident to be 
discussed in this short note. But it is of the same 
caliber that the Ministry of Arts and Culture is 
trying to implement for the theater. A play is 
sifted through in such a fashion that it doesn't 
hurt or touch anymore. (Literature, religion, 
traditions, underprivileged classes of the society 
are not to be discussed.) Now the publication of 
books is subjected to the same rule (Baraheni 1977, 
119-20).
Moreover, SAVAK constantly scrutinized "potential trouble spots," 
such as labor unions, peasant organizations, student groups, and even 
mosques. The agency was "a law onto itself, having legal authority to
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arrest and detain suspected persons almost indefinitely. SAVAK operated 
its own prisons.... There was no institutional check, with the 
exception of the Shah in these activities" (Area Handbook of Iran 1978, 
372-74). To be released, prisoners often had to agree to become 
informers. "Of the fourteen people I met in prison cells during my 
imprisonment in 1973, at least two had been asked to become members of 
SAVAK, and upon refusal they had been tortured" (Baraheni 1977, 8). 
Because of the importance of the extended family network in Iran, with 
every person arrested, SAVAK gained "one hundred bitter enemies from 
among his relations" (Rubin 1980, 177). In coming years SAVAK was also 
said to have tortured clerics who spoke out against the abuse of power. 
Ayatollah Saidi died during torture, and soon after him, Ayatollah 
Azarshari. Ayatollah Teleghani (1910-1979) emerged from five years of 
imprisonment without eyelids and with only a short time to live. SAVAK 
agents were said to have burned his eyelids with cigarettes when he 
closed them to avoid having to watch his daughter being raped by SAVAK 
(Kapuscinski 1985, 76-7). In 1977, Khomeini's older son died 
mysteriously. SAVAK received the blame (Algar in Khomeini 1981, 19).
As the citizens became increasingly intimidated people actually tried to 
avoid utterances in private conversation that could have been taken as 
criticism of the regime, such as "oppresiveness, darkness, burden, 
abyss, collapse, cage, bars, chain, wither away," among others 
(Kapuscinski 1985, 44). SAVAK was the Shah's "eyes and ears, and where 
necessary, his iron fist" (Graham 1979, 143). Baraheni asserts there 
have been days on which SAVAK agents kidnapped up to 5,000 people. An 
American Embassy official told teachers at the Iran-America Society, 
operated by the United States, to expect at least one SAVAK informer in
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each classroom--the same held for Iranian universities. One instructor 
reported that he mentioned the Shah "'just to get a reaction.'" To his 
amazement, no one even "batted an eyelash." They were too "paralyzed 
with fear" at the mere mention of his name (Rubin 1980, 178-9).
The existing system meant that the entire population 
was subjected to a constant all-pervasive terror.
While most secret police operations concentrate on 
finding their government's most active enemies SAVAK 
went out of its way to punish those suspected of the 
most petty offenses. The broad nature of SAVAK's 
intimidation and the surety of its blow was a 
constant psychological humiliation for almost every 
Iranian. The result was a deep desire for vengeance 
on the part of the Shah's subjects (Rubin 1980,
178) .
Iranians were in jeopardy even abroad. "Everything I said during my 
stay in the United States in the academic year of 1972-1973, before my 
imprisonment, had been reported to SAVAK, which operates on a global 
scale" (Baraheni 1977, 8).
Then, the year 1959 introduced another period of confrontation 
between the clergy and the regime. One of the major issues during this
g
crisis was the land reform bill of 1959, ratified in 1960.
Because landowners had been blamed for all kinds of social evils--the 
bill was supposed to proportion land more "fairly" among the population. 
The bill, considered "illconceived" by many, and "contrary to Islam" and 
to the shari'a, limited the amount of land anyone could hold (Lambton in 
Yar-Shater 1971, 16). Because of intense opposition to the 
bill-- including the voice of Ayatollah Burujirdi, who spoke for many 
landowners--the bill remained inoperative. Open opposition of the 
clergy to the land reform bill signalled a change in the tactical
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alliance of two groups with fundamentally different perspectives (Akahvi 
1980, 92). In March 1961 Ayatollah Burujirdi died. In May 1961, the 
Shah dissolved the Majlis, and decreed that strong rule had to replace 
the ineffective previous government. In November 1961, he ordered the 
government to implement the land law of May 1960. "The resulting rule 
by royal decree amounted to autocracy" (Akhavi 1980, 94). The cabinet 
approved a new version of the bill in January 1962. Meanwhile, the 
Shi1a, left leaderless and stunned with the death of Burujirdi, found 
themselves unable to react in concert to the latest measures of the 
regime. The mujtahids also feared government interference in the 
process of selecting a successor (Akhavi 1980, 99-100).
Because of the methods proposed by the bill, the economic position 
of the majority of the peasants worsened within a few years. Moreover, 
land reform upset the social organization with its complex network of 
exchange--that tied into religious institutions, and thus assaulted the 
integrative system concretely. It therefore upset "role structures with 
a communications network uniting the occupants of these roles." And it 
disturbed people and artifacts, "bound together by a network of inputs 
and outputs of energy and information, or objects" (Boulding 1970, 22; 
his definition of social organization). Land reform not only affected 
waqf properties--it also extended Tehran's control over the country 
side. As Hooglund notes:
The real significance of the land reform lay not in 
its distribution of agricultural property, but 
rather in its role as a symbol of determination of 
the Shah's government to intervene in rural affairs 
(1982, 123).
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The Pahlavis continued to be one of the largest landowning families.
The Shah's brother Abul Reza was nicknamed "'Iran's number one farmer.'"
Mohammed Reza himself owned a large commercial farm. Other relatives
had interests in similar entrprises (Abrahamian 1982, 437).
In the wake of land reform, riots broke out, beginning at the 
University of Tehran, and involving the resurgent National Front. They
protested the illegal suspension of parliament. The clergy also
challenged the regime, besides land reform, they reacted to two 
additional developments: 1) the growing autocracy of the Shah; and 2)
corruption of the regime (Akhavi 1980, 95).
In January 1963, the Shah inaugurated the six point program of the 
"White Revolution." Besides comprehensive land reform, the six point 
program included the following changes: 1) the nationalization of
forests and pastures; 2) public sale of state-owned factories as 
security for land reform; 3) worker's profit sharing in industry; 4) 
amendment of the electoral law and franchise for women; and 5) 
formation of Literacy Corps (Saikal 1980, 82). The program, supposed to 
reshape the political, social and econoimc life of Iran, was approved 
under autocratic conditions to give the appearance of popular approval. 
Many Iranians perceived the measures "as being imposed on the country by 
the United States and designed to bring about augmentation of the Shah's 
power and wealth, as well as intensification of United States 
dominance,.." (Algar in Khomeini 1981, 16). In March 1963, the Shah 
distributed land reform deeds in Qum, in the face of hostility of the 
ulama. In a speech there, he branded them "'100 times more treacherous 
than the Tudeh.'" And charged, "'the black reactionaries' and 
'destructive red elements' will not sit quietly. They cannot see the
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implementation of the six bills which insure the prosperity and glory of 
Iran and make it an advanced Modern Iran..."(qtd. in Zonis 1971, 75). 
When seminary students demonstrated publicly--police occupied madrasas, 
mosques and shrines. Some of the students died when police threw them 
into the dry riverbed from the roof of Faisiyeh madrasa. Then, on April 
1, 1963, speaking in Mashad, the monarch called the ulama "'a hindrance 
to the progress of the country,'" and advised them to stay out of 
politics (In Floor 1980, 513). In this context, Khomeini became the 
voice of the opposition against the Shah's measures. He became the 
first religious leader to frontally attack the Shah. The very steps 
taken by the Shah in search of stability and authority, namely: 1)
strengthening ties with the United States; 2) establishing SAVAK; 3) 
suppressing the National Front; 4) inaugurating the White Revolution; 
and 5) to a large extent, suppressing religious opposition, vulnerable 
because of lack of leadership since the death of Ayatollah Burujirdi, 
only reflected growing distance.
IN THE FACE OF CONTINUED THREAT:
KHOMEINI--THE VOICE OF THE OPPOSITION--THE PROMISE OF SECURITY
Out of the prevailing sense of insecurity and uncertainty, basic to 
the "threat of being at issue," Khomeini emerged as central figure, 
offering a vision of the future based on "Holy Law." Born in 1902, in 
Khomein, Khomeini, the son and grandson of religious scholars, went to 
Iraq for religious studies at the age of seventeen, and became the pupil 
of Shaykh Iraqi, a close associate of Shaykh Nuri who had been a 
spokesman for the mujtahids during the Constitutional Revolution
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(1905-1911) (Fischer in Esposito 1983, 151). Later, Khomeini attached 
himself to the circle of Shaykh Ha'iri. He settled on Qum in 1922, 
following Ha'iri there. The arrival of Ha'iri in Qum elevated it to the 
spiritual capital of Islamic Iran. Soon Khomeini became a popular 
teacher at one of the madrasas. His major assertions include that 
educated religious figures are representatives of the Imam until his 
return. Civil authority is "invalid" and "illegitimate." Although part 
of the passive opposition to the Pahlavi regime during the 1940s and 
1950s, Khomeini politically followed Burujirdi--who had replaced Ha'iri 
after his death in 1937, as spiritual leader of the faithful (Algar in 
Khomeini 1981, 15; Fischer in Esposito 1983, 152). Both, Burujirdi and 
Khomeini denounced the leading role in government during the Mossadeq 
interlude of well known religious figure Ayatollah Kashani. Kashani was 
"a fierce nationalist and political leader who broke with Mossadeq and 
implicitly supported the Shah. [He] challenged the government, however, 
when in 1954 Iran normalized its relations with the United Kingdom" 
(Floor 1980, 503). Burujirdi and Khomeini accused him of having left 
huge financial debts. Under his influence, oil had become nationalized 
in Iran. Khomeini argued, Kashani should have been more concerned with 
Islam than with oil.
It was rumored that Khomeini had broken with Burujirdi just before 
the latter's death in 1961. To this extent, Burujirdi had allegedly 
warned, "'Do not follow Ruhullah, lest you find yourselves knee deep in 
blood'" (qtd. in Fischer, in Esposito 1983, 153). Whatever had 
transpired, Khomeini became less restrained in his criticism of civil 
authority after the death of Ayatollah Burujirdi.
In 1962, Khomeini led the opposition to the enfranchisement of
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women, to the local council election bill (considered rigged elections, 
as explained earlier) and to land reform. He argued that land reform 
was contrary to Islam which guaranteed the sanctity of private property. 
In early 1963, Khomeini led the opposition to the White Revolution and 
generally, to the modernization program perceived as political, 
cultural, and economic subordination to the West (Fischer in Esposito 
1983, 153).
Against this backdrop, the activists among the ulama urged 
Khomeini, their emergent leader, to defend Islam, reminding him that 
under the circumstances, it was his duty to comply. Ayatollah Milani,
in a widely publicized letter expressed his concerns in this way, ”...
religious and national interests are threatened and violated by the 
corrupt Ruling Body.... It would be strange for a Moslem to allow 
himself to remain silent under such circumstances and fail to defend 
Islam" (qtd. in Zonis 1971, 45).
Under the circumstances of 1963, Khomeini declared the end of 
taqiyya (dissimulation) (Heikal 1981, 85). He became recognized as one 
of seven marja-i taqlid (Fischer in Esposito 1983, 153). He called the 
mullahs to join him, or they would clearly "have chosen to side with 
Satan." Meanwhile he kept Moslem leaders in other countries informed of 
his version of the proceedings (Algar in Keddie 1972, 244-55; Fischer 
1980; Heikal 1981, 85-91; Stempel 1981; Wilber 1981, 332-33).
On the fortieth day of the anniversary of the killing of students
of Faisiyeh Seminary in Qum by paratroopers in March 1963, Khomeini gave
9
a rhetorically powerful speech. In it, he drew parallels between 
recent events and the killings and desecration of the shrine of Imam 
Reza in Mashad by soldiers under Reza Shah in 1935. They had fired upon
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protesters against Western dress codes and against general conditions of 
tyranny. He asserted, the regime was destroying the "ordinances of 
Islam for the sake of oil and Israel." And also, "that it was 
attempting to place the affairs of Muslims in the hands of 'Jews, 
Christians and the enemies of Islam1" (Fischer in Esposito 1983,
154).^ Khomeini's pictures adorned the bazaars of Iran, "as 
symbol of the type of opposition to illegitimate authority offered by 
Hossein..." (Zonis 1971, 45). Continuing his attacks on the 
government, he delivered another powerful speech on the tenth of 
Muharram (3 June 1963), the most intense day of mourning of the Shi'i 
ritual calendar. He used "demagogic rhetoric" characterizing events in 
villainous terms, invoking the Karbala symbolism. As Klapp postulates, 
projecting distress onto "Satan," or an "oppressor," allows for renewed 
integration, and for the "closing of the system." Villain images 
facilitate this process --because they embody anxiety in personal form, 
serving as focus for hostility (Klapp 1978, 83-94). In terms of 
"boundary maintenance" they reestablish cohesion in communities in the 
face of threat to solidarity (Erikson 1966). Khomeini's speech included 
other language that has special symbolic meaning for believers, like the 
term zulm, referring to hurt, oppression, injustice, and taqut, denoting 
tyrannical earthly power. In the context of the happenings of 1963, 
these terms express "an existential, almost cosmic, situation which at 
certain times sheds its vague truth value and becomes an exact 
description of contemporary events" (Fischer 1980, 7). Thus,
"[Khomeini] began with a rawzeh, a rhetorical form, normally occurring 
at the end rather than the beginning of a sermon or preachment which 
elicits weeping and is intended to instill in listeners a stoical
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determination to re-dedicate themselves to the principles of Islam no 
matter what the odds and external pressures:"
I seek refuge in Allah from the pursuing Satan. In 
the name of God, the most merciful, the most 
compasionate. It is now the evening of Ashura.
Sometimes when I review the events of Ashura, I 
confront this question: If the Ummayyids and Yezid,
the son of Moaviyeh, were waging war only with 
Husain, why then the savage, inhuman behavior 
towards helpless women and the innocent children of 
Husain? What had the women and children done? What 
had the six month old baby of Husain done? [The 
audience cries.] I think they wanted to destroy the 
foundation [of the family of the Prophet]. The 
Umayyids and the regime of Yezid were against the 
family of the Prophet. They did not want the Bani 
Hashem to exist and they wanted to uproot the sacred 
[family] tree.
Khomeini made explicit the metaphor of the arch-tyrant and destroyer of
Islam, Yazid, standing in for the Shah:
I ask the same question here: If the brutal regime
of Iran is engaged in a war with the ulama, why did 
it tear the Quran apart while attacking Faisiyeh 
Seminary? What did it have against the Faisiyeh
Seminary? What did it have against the students of
theology? What did it have against the eighteen
year old sayyid [Sayyid Younes Rudbari who had been
killed in the March assault]? [The audience cries.] 
What had the eighteen year old sayyid done to the 
Shah? What had he done aginst the government? What 
had he done against the brutal regime of Iran? [The 
audience cries.] Therefore we must conclude that it 
wanted to do away with the foundation. It is
against the foundation of Islam and the clergy. It
does not want this foundation to exist. It does not
want our youth and elders to exist.
He expressed anger at Israel, to him the root of all satanic evil, and 
at the Shah's charge that the clergy are parasites. He considers the 
rich parasites:
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I advise you Mr. Shah, Shah sir, I advise you to 
change your ways. If one day our masters decide you 
should go, I would not want the people to have cause 
to celebrate your departure. I do not wish for you 
the same destiny as your father.... God knows that 
the people rejoiced when Pahlavi left.... Listen to 
the advice of the clergy.... Do not listen to 
Israel.... I hope when you said the reactionaries 
are impure animals, you were not referring to the 
clergy. Otherwise our duty will be most onerous and 
you will have a difficult time. You will not be 
able to live. The people will not let you continue. 
Are Islam and the clergy black reactionaries? But 
you black reactionary, you have created this white 
revolution. For what is this white revolution?
Khomeini also counter-threatened when he heard that a group of clergy 
were detained in Tehran by the secret police, threatened and forced to 
promise they would refrain from talking against the Shah and against 
Israel, and from charging that Islam is in danger. He blamed the Shah 
for all of the crimes SAVAK committed; because SAVAK killed by order of 
the Shah (Khomeini 1981, 218). He concluded:
Our country, our Islam is in danger. What is 
happening, and what is about to happen worries and 
saddens us. We are worried and saddened by the 
situation of this ruined country. We hope to God 
that things can be reformed (Fischer in Esposito 
1983, 154-158).
Early the next morning, on June 4, 1963, he was arrested, during 
the emotional period of Muharram. In the wake of his arrest, "a day of 
infamy," occurred on June 5 (15 Khordad). During intense demonstrations 
in Iran, the army massacred thousands. "...an event symbolized in 
popular memory with the image of thousands of black-shirted marchers 
enroute from Qum to Tehran being strafed by air force planes" (Fischer
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1980, 188). The government succeeded in suppressing the riots and 
imposed martial law. The regime rounded up opposition leaders, 250 in 
the last four months of 1963. Arrests continued for the next two years 
(Fischer 1980, 188). (The international press began reporting tortures 
in Iran consistenly from 1965 on.) Top ranking clergy saved Khomeini 
from execution by elevating him to ayatollah al-uzma, the highest rank 
of clergy. He was thus protected by the constitution of 1905-1906--and 
the government heeded notice that his execution would evoke serious 
consequences. Released to Qum after two months, on August 3, 1963, he 
announced that he would not be intimidated, expressed in the Koranic 
verse, "'From God we come and unto Him we shall return,'" with which he 
began his rawzeh. He elicited much crying. In October 1963, just 
before the election of a new parliament replacing the one the Shah had 
dissolved in May 1961, SAVAK agents seized Khomeini from his home. He 
was said to have ordered his followers to boycott the vote because of 
government interference in the elections (Zonis 1971, 46). In October 
1964 the majlis passed a bill accepting a $200 million loan from the 
United States for the purchase of military equipment. The law included 
a stipulation granting immunity from Iranian law to American military 
personnel, thus extending rights of extraterritoriality reserved for 
diplomats to many individuals outside of the embassy staff (Beeman in 
Keddie 1983, 209). Khomeini declared the agreement with the United 
States "'a document for the enslavement of Iran'" (Algar in Keddie 1972, 
246-47). He asserted further:
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If any of them commits a crime in Iran, they are 
immune. If an American servant or cook terrorizes 
your source of religious authority in the middle of 
the bazaar, the Iranian police does not have the 
right to stop him. The Iranian courts cannot put 
him on trial or interrogate him. He should go to 
America where the masters would decide what to 
do.... We do not consider this government a 
government. These are traitors. They are traitors 
to the country (qtd. in Ismael 1980, 610).
Never offically charged with any wrongdoing and never brought to 
trial, the regime exiled Khomeini to Turkey on November 4, 1964, and 
later allowed him to move to the Shi'i stronghold of Najaf, in Iraq. He 
lived there for the next fifteen years, and served as marja-i taqlid to 
his followers. He continued to send tape-recorded speeches, messages 
and writings to Iran.
Iranian students abroad who were members of the Third National 
Front, a faction of the original National Front, expressed their views 
on the recent developments in Iran. In their Newsletter (Kharbanameh), 
they published the following article entitled "'The Lessons of 1963'":
During Muharram 1963, it was the religious leaders 
and not the political parties that inspired and 
encouraged the masses. The major lesson to be drawn 
from 1963 is that the 'ulama have a crucial role to 
play in our antiimperialist struggle--just as they 
did in the tobacco crisis of 1891-1892, in the 
constitutional revolution of 1905-1911, and in the 
nationalist movement of 1950-1953 (qtd. in 
Abrahamian 1982, 461).
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EVENTS CONTRIBUTING TO THE GROWING GULF--OUT OF THE VOID EMERGES 
KHOMEINI--THE VOICE OF COUNTER-THREAT IN THE NAME OF ISLAM
According to Fischer, Khomeini began formulating "a justification 
for maximalist control of the clergy in the political sphere," only from 
1970-1971 onward, thus abandoning his efforts to merely reform the Shah 
(In Esposito 1983, 163). The following passage from Khomeini's book 
Islamic Government, based on a series of lectures given at Najaf between 
January 21 and February 8, 1970, exemplifies this trend:
In order to assure the unity of the Islamic umma, in 
order to liberate the Islamic homeland from 
occupation and penetration by the imperialists and 
their puppet governments, it is imperative that we 
establish a government. In order to attain the 
unity and freedom of the Muslim peoples, we must 
overthrow the oppressive governments installed by 
the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic 
government of Justice that will be in the service of 
the people. The formation of such a government will 
serve to preserve the disciplined unity of the 
Muslims; just as Fatimat az-Zahra (upon whom may be 
peace) said in his address: 'The Imamate exists for
the sake of preserving order among the Muslims and 
replacing their disunity with unity' (1981, 49).
He offers further, one establishes an Islamic Government "with 
persuasion (tabliqat) by creating enough like minded people to have the 
power to struggle..." (Fischer 1980, 153).
Meanwhile, from 1964 to 1975 the Shah added another eleven points 
to his White Revolution program (see Glossary). To realize his goals, 
he saw land reform as an essential measure. Through other changes he 
tried to assure a regulated and equal relationship between employer and 
employee, assure women's equality, eliminate illiteracy and disease, end
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"backwardness" in the villages, connect the outer regions to the rest of 
the nation, and establish general conditions of harmony in the context 
of "today's civilized world" (Pahlavi 1980, 101). Pondering some of the 
innovations in retrospect, a "candid" city planner offered this view of 
Qum in 1975, several years after land reform:
After land reform, agriculture declined because the 
new small holders did not have the money to keep up 
the water supplies. Therefore there was a great 
influx of people into town.., and this together with 
the growth of industry led to a boom land situation.
A number of big shots seized land and just began 
selling it without concern for hospitals, parks, or 
other needs. A proper road system was not laid oUt, 
and so we have roads that just end, and all traffic 
is funneled through the center of town. A number of 
obvious things have to be done: complete the road
pattern so there can be circulation; build a bus 
terminal on the Tehran road; create parking 
facilities for visitors to the shrine; map out a 
proper land-use zoning system. (qtd. in Fischer 
1980, 123).
By the time the masterplan for Qum, drawn in 1975, had travelled through 
the state bureaucracy of Tehran, much of the construction had already 
been completed. Similar projects were under way throughout Iran 
(Fischer 1980, 123). Land reform and some of the other changes left 
three distinct groups in the countryside by the early 1970s, namely: 1) 
absentee farmers, including the royal family, religious foundations, 
agrobusiness, and old-time landlords who had found loopholes allowing 
them to keep large parcels of land; 2) independent farmers? consisting 
of former peasant proprietors, and about 1,638,000 families that had 
benefited from land reform; and 3) rural wage earners bypassed by land 
reform and former nomads whose migratory routes had been cut off 
(Abrahamian 1982, 429-30).
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Also in the early 1970s, urban areas experienced a "minor 
industrial revolution." The urban population grew from 38 percent in 
1966 to 48 percent in 1976, following the growth of new schools, health 
facilities and industrial plants, located mostly in cities. Infant 
mortality dropped--and the rank of children increased. "By the 
mid-1970s, half the population was under sixteen years of age and 
two-thirds under thirty" (Abrahamian 1982, 431).
While the Shah strove to modernize the socioeconomic structure--he 
neglected to develop the political system:
[to permit] the formation of pressure groups, open 
political arena for various social forces, forge 
links between the regime and the old classes, and 
broaden the social base of the monarchy that, after 
all, had survived mainly because of the 1953 
military coup d'etat. Instead of modernizing the 
political system, the shah, like his father, based 
his power on the three Pahlevi pillars: the armed
forces, the court patronage network, and the vast 
state bureaucracy (Abrahamian 1982, 435).
That is to say, in considering the military establishment his central 
support, the monarch continually increased its size and took a major 
interest in the well-being of his officers. He supervised their 
training, participated in their military maneuvers, offered them 
generous salaries and pensions, state of the art medical facilities, 
attractive housing, and an array of fringe benefits. He also personally 
supervised all promotions above the rank of major. In addition, the 
court patronage network consisted of members of the royal family, and of 
close personal friends. They received lucrative salaries, pensions, and 
sinecures in exchange for services rendered. And lastly, the state 
bureaucracy continually grew, from 12 ministries with about 150,000
61
civil servants in 1963, to 19 ministries and over 304,000 civil servants 
in 1977. This proliferation permitted the state "to penetrate more 
deeply" into the life of the ordinary citizen (Abrahamian 1982, 435-9).
At the same time, the monarch strove to establish his legitimacy 
and authority with several grand, national celebrations. In 1965, he 
celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of his reign and acquired the 
title Aryamehr or Light of the Aryans. In 1967 came his elaborate 
coronation ceremony during which he proclaimed himself Shahinsha (King 
of Kings), and his wife Farah, to be Empress. In a speech during this 
occasion, he asserted he had crowned himself "'because now the Iranian 
people are living in prosperity and security. I long ago promised 
myself that I would never be king over a people who were beggars and 
oppressed'" (Quoted in Heikal 1981, 93). And, as F. Hoveyda, the 
Shah's Ambassador to the United States, and brother of Amir Abbas 
Hoveyda, Prime Minister under the Shah (executed April 7, 1979) asserts:
That he was determined to have crowned himself is 
understandable. That he should have waited for 
twenty six years before doing it can also be 
accepted. He himself put forward an apparently 
logical explanation: that he had waited for his
people's standard of living to improve. Was that 
not a form of legitimation? The coronation followed 
as a consequence of services rendered, because the 
people recognized what might be called the utility 
of the sovereign, and so offered him the crown. 
Actually he could then have created a new line 
rooted in tradition: to have the crown given to him
by a representative of the people, and not to take 
it himself. A true leader should be chosen or 
elected (1980, 123).
In 1969 came the twentieth anniversary of his reign. Then during 
the splendid Persepolis affair in 1971, celebrating the 2,500th
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anniversary of the monarchy, and attended by hundreds of foreign heads 
of state, the Shah tried to link his monarchy to the Persian Empire of 
Cyrus the Great, and asserted Aryan roots. In the eyes of the Shi1a, 
this connection to historical, pre-Islamic, pagan roots only widened the 
gulf between the monarch and the believers --because it further 
emphasized differentiation between religious and secular roots--and 
because the Persian Empire had enjoyed close connections with Judaism 
(Hoveyda 1980, 12--32; Heikal 1981, 83).^ Baraheni relates that 
television covered the event. It took place under an "encampment of 
luxurious tents--all made in Europe and flown along with thousand of 
other items via Tehran and Shiraz to the Persepolis" (1977, 101). 
Thousands of Iranians watched as the Shah, followed by celebrities, 
walked to the Passargade where the tomb of King Cyrus is located. They 
heard him say, "'Cyrus! You rest in peace, I am awake’1' (Baraheni 1977, 
100). The Pahlavi dynasty seemed to strive "to circumvent Islam in the 
definition of the Iranian State" (Beeman in Keddie 1983, 210). In 
violent reaction, Khomeini charged:
The shameful, bloody, so-called White Revolution, 
which in a single day caused fifteen thousand 
Muslims to be killed by tanks and machine guns, has 
made the fate of our people still bleaker and darker 
and worsened the life of the enslaved peasantry. In 
many of our cities and most villages, clinics, 
doctors, and medicines are not to be found. There 
is no trace of schools, bathhouses, or clean 
drinking water. As some newspapers admit, the poor 
children are so hungry that they go to graze in the 
fields. Yet the tyrannical regime spends hundreds 
of millions of tumans of the country's wealth on 
various shameful "festivals": the birthday of this
or that person, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
accession to the throne, the coronation, and worst 
and most catastropic of all, the vile festival of
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the twenty-five hundreds anniversary of the monarchy 
(qtd. in Khomeini 1981, 198).
In a declaration issued from Najaf, Khomeini encouraged "the oppressed 
people of Iran" to send letters and telegrams in open protest of the 
celebrations to the government of Iran, and to let their voices "be 
heard throughout the world." He warned, that if the ulama of all major 
Iranian cities banned together and protested collectively, including the 
more than 150,000 students and scholars of religious sciences, these 
"authorities, proofs of Islam and ayatullahs"- - they would achieve their 
aims and overthrow the government (Khomeini 1981, 205-208). He further 
declared this:
The people of Islam should mourn the usurpation of 
rule from 'Ali (upon whom be peace) and commemorate 
those few years when he was the blessed embodiment 
of Islamic rule. They should commemorate his 
justice, the fact that he was part of his people, 
that his standard of living was lower than that of 
others while his spirit rose ever higher above the 
horizons. One should commemorate a ruler who, when 
he hears that an anklet has been stolen from a 
non-Muslim woman living under the protection of 
Islam, wishes to die of shame; who, when he thinks 
that someone may be going hungry in his realm, 
suffers hunger voluntarily himself. One should 
commemorate a rule that uses the sword to protect 
his people and protect them from fear. But as for a 
regime founded on oppression and thievery whose only 
aim is to satisfy its own lustful desires--only when 
it is overthrown can the people celebrate and 
rejoice.... 'As for those who disbelieve, they 
engage in pleasure and in eating as the beasts, and 
the fire shall be their abode' (Qur'an 47:12). One 
who eats and takes his pleasure with no concern for 
what is permitted or forbidden, for the manner in 
which he has acquired his property, who pays no 
attention to the condition of the people or to the 
ordinances of the law--such a man lives like an 
animal. A ruler who fits this description and 
wishes to rule over the people and the nation in
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accordance with his carnal and bestial desires will
produce nothing but disaster. The people must mourn
the existence of such a government and weep over 
their misfortune; to celebrate in such 
circumstances would be totally senseless (qtd. in 
Khomeini 1981, 200-01).
To worsen matters, also, in 1971, the year of the Persepolis
ceremony, the Shah considered creating a Religion Corps. For one,
induction into the corps might serve as punitive measure for clerical 
opponents to the regime, by drafting them into the army. Drafting them 
would remove them from their areas of activity and following. For 
another, state influence would thus penetrate into the
countryside--parallel to the Literacy Corps already operative in remote
villages since the White Revolution. Members of the corps would be more
difficult to reach by Khomeini--who responded in this way:
... the poisonous culture of imperialism is 
penetrating to the depths of towns and villages 
throughout the Muslim world, displacing the culture 
of the Qur'an.... Invoking Islam and pretending to 
be Muslims, they [the regime] strive to annihilate 
Islam, as they abolish and obliterate the sacred 
commands of the Qur'an one after the other (qtd. in 
Algar in Keddie 1972, 253).
At the same time, consistent with Boulding's postulations, that 
under threat conditions the ruling group is "cut-off from effective two 
way communication"--the Shah became unresponsive to the needs, opinions, 
and sentiments of many Iranians. In the 1960s, in the face of fierce 
opposition, the Shah had launched a program of drastic reforms, 
discussed thus far, trying to catapult Iran into the twentieth century. 
Along the way, he lost sight of it--became distant from the 
population--increasingly alarming and alienating them. The Nixon visit
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in 1972, and again, the jump in oil prices in 1973-1974, seemed to 
exacerbate this condition (Hoveyda 1980, 148-50). Information feedback 
had little or no influence on policy decisions. Ambassador Sullivan 
noted in 1977-1978 that none of the Shah's advisors shared their honest 
views with the monarch. They would avoid discussing them even amongst 
each other, and pretended always to agree with policy decisions, even 
applauding them. In private, however, they confessed their fears and 
apprehensions to Sullivan, one by one (1981, 71).
Particularly from 1975-1976 onward, the Shah made "serious mistakes 
in the conduct of the country's affairs" (Hoveyda 1980, 148-150). 
"Communists" and "anarchists" received all the blame for any internal 
problems the Shah acknowledged. In the meantime, opponents of the 
"repellent center," the Pahlavi political order, gradually united around 
a "positive pole," Khomeini (Green 1982). The organ of the exiled 
Liberation Movement encouraged this consolidation already in 1972, in an 
editorial on '"The Struggles of the Religious Leaders’":
The Shi'i leaders have always helped Iran’s struggle 
against despotism and imperialism. Since the days 
of the Constitutional Revolution, since the bleak 
years of Reza Shah's repression, and since the 
bloody demonstrations of 1963, the 'ulama have 
allied themselves with the masses. Ayatollah 
Khomeini, who has lived in exile since 1964, is now 
the main opponent of the regime, and other national 
traitors do their very best to drive a wedge between 
us and the progressive religious leaders.... We 
will do all we can to create unity between the 
political opposition and the religious leaders, 
especially Ayatollah Khomeini. United we will 
destroy the hated regime (qtd. in Abrahamian 1982, 
461-62).
Across the gulf, however, the monarch was living "in a fantasy world of
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his own creation," (Green 1982, 68). His "blind confidence" centered on 
"dangerously simplistic views." Namely, financial means make everything 
possible--and Iran's income will continue to grow indefinitely. He 
ignored all information signalling danger (Hoveyda 1980, 154).
For one, in the context of strained relations with the ulama and 
their following, inflation because of high government spending, 
breakdowns in planning, contraction of the oil markets, and 
corruption-- the Shah in 1975, embarked on an intense "antiprofiteering" 
campaign. In its wake, the government fined 10,000 merchants, arrested 
7,500, and closed 600 shops. The bazaar was one of the major targets 
(Rubin 1980, 156).
For another, without warning, the Shah announced his plan to 
establish a one party system in Iran.
...the Shahanshah, on March 2, 1975, announced the 
establishment in Iran of a single party system. The 
existing multi-party system he said, was being 
abolished because there was no role for an 
opposition party to play in a country where 
programmes were being implemented in the interests 
of the entire nation. The one party was also being 
set up to permit all Iranians to rally round 'one 
standard, one philosophy, one highly organized 
apparatus to preserve the interests of Iran today 
and tomorrow' (Green 1982, 54).
According to the Shah, it was essential for all Iranians to participate 
in the political process and strive toward a common goal, namely, to 
make Iran one of the foremost powers by the year 2000. In this sense, 
the party was a political instrument to mobilize the citizenry "into the 
government-controlled mainstream of political life" (Area Handbook of 
Iran 1978, 201). Citizens registered to vote under pressure. They were
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told, nonvoting indicated "'lack of party discipline.1" And further, 
"'nonvoting is not only an act of treason against experimentation with 
democracy, but also an escape from social and party responsibilities'" 
(qtd. in Mohammadi-Nejad 1977, 109). Rumors arose that nonvoters would 
be denied passports, would lose their jobs, and more. Rastakhiz party 
organs handed out leaflets that warned:
Those who will not join the Rastakhiz Party are 
either traitors who belong in prison or people who 
do not believe in the Shah, the Nation, and the
Homeland and thus ought not expect to be treated in
the same way as others (Kapuscinski 1985, 88).
Initial response to registration was cool. By May 23, 1975, 1/2 Million 
people had registered to vote. With continual "prodding," by May 28, 
registration had reached 1.5 Million. Candidates handed out ballots 
with their name on them before the election. The Shahanshah had 
succeeded once again in extending his control over the country. Because 
of the distance between him and the bulk of the population, however, he 
was unaware at what tremendous cost he had "won."
REFLECTIONS OF DISTANCE
Considering recent developments in Iran, F. Hoveyda (the brother 
of Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister under the Shah, and executed April
7, 1979) made this entry in his diary on February 9, 1975:
I resent nonparticipation to such a degree, that all 
coherent thought deserts me.... Everything seems 
bogus. Impression that we are all phantoms jostling
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about on the proscenium in front of an unreal stage.
The feeling of identification with a homeland in 
progress which moved me once, is quickly fading. We 
are actors in a tragicomedy with no certain outcome 
(Hoveyda 1980, 102).
According to Zonis, "depoliticalization ensues from exclusion in the 
political process and resembles "demoralization." As a result, many 
intellectuals withdraw sullenly, and participate in the economic life of 
the state without enthusiasm. In Iran, some such "co-depressed" met in 
weekly circles (dowrehs), and commiserated (1971, 40-1). Davud Ramzi, 
an Iranian writer expresses their theme in his "Akharin Istgah" (The 
Last Station):
High walls 
Very high 
As high as the world 
I am surrounded 
Foolishly I try to make a path 
Dead ends everywhere 
Every escape blocked 
(In Bill 1972, 76).
In addition, some of the faculty of Tehran University, a haven for 
depoliticized Iranians in the 1970s, openly spoke out against 
governmental policies. They saw the incursion of Western culture as so 
extensive that it "robbed Eastern societies of their creative abilities" 
and imposed "its own special pattern of life on all fields." They 
appealed to "young men and women to wake up to the perils of the present 
trend and to realize that without the foundation of a national culture, 
the trappings of Western culture can only lead to destruction of the 
country" (Wilber 1981, 210). Hoveyda wrote this to a friend in 1975:
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The big problem in Iran right now is not economic 
but cultural. A cultural substructure is loosely 
and imperfectly bound to a Western veneer that will 
not hold. The country is heading for disaster. The 
more the material side is assured, the more 
metaphysical problems will grow (1980, 104).
As cities spread haphazardly, and automobiles clogged the streets, life 
for many Iranians took on a more frantic pace. Many peasant families, 
despairing over being unable to support themselves from their land, sold 
or abandoned their property, and migrated (Hooglund 1982, 121). Family 
living patterns changed, as people became widely separated. Telephones 
were supposed to fill the void created by less person to person contact. 
Only those with time and money, however, could acquire the device. In 
addition, radios, cassette recorders, cars, and televisons became 
considered necessities in Iranian life. Even in villages without 
running water or electricity, numerous television antennas dotted the 
landscape, run by gasoline generators. At the same time, in spite of 
the Literacy Corps, only an estimated 37 percent of Iranians were 
literate by 1977 (Area Handbook of Iran 1978, xi). Low budget, 
melodrama-type films appeared in abundance, attracting the urban youth, 
much to the dismay of the clergy. Large numbers of Iranian students 
went abroad to study at foreign universities. About 33,000 of them 
studied in the United States alone by 1976. Upon their return to Iran, 
they pursued life based on newly acquired attitudes toward traditionally 
sensitive matters, such as male-female relations for example, upsetting 
their elders. They also realized that many of the specific skills 
learned abroad had little to do with life in Iran. They had difficulty 
translating them to fit Iranian requirements. "The problems of 
developing a bazaar economy into an investment capital network were
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ill-served by American graduate-level econometrics" (Beeman in Keddie 
1983, 209). Returning young professionals and intellectuals often felt 
alienated and useless. Some of them established permanent residences 
abroad. Some stayed and tried to adjust.
Most, however, harbored a lingering feeling of 
resentment against the United States and other 
Western nations that had hosted them--not for 
anything they had done to them, but for their 
education, which was to be their salvation yet 
became a hollow fulfillment of the promise it had 
offered (Beeman in Keddie 1983, 209).
Bamdad exemplifies their dilemma as follows:
I am bothered by a pain 
Which isn't mine.
I have lived in a land 
Which isn't mine.
I have lived with a name 
Which isn't mine.
I have wept of grief 
Which isn't mine 
I was born out of j oy 
Which isn't mine.
I die of a death 
Which isn't mine 
(In Arasteh 1970, 188).
A steadily growing upper-middle class began visiting Europe and the 
United States each year in large numbers. Many went simply on shopping 
trips, using flights solidly booked most of the time by the mid-1970s. 
Boutiques began to appear in Tehran and in other major cities, carrying 
Western luxury items, and inviting shoppers to complete their Western 
wardrobe. Young Iranian children frequented summer camps in Switzerland 
and toured many of the Western capitals, never having seen the classical 
cities of Iran (Beeman in Keddie 1983, 206-211).
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For the bulk of the population the foreign 
orientation of everything around them--television, 
architecture, film, clothing, social attitudes, 
educational goals, and economic development 
aims--seemed to resemble a strange, alien growth on 
the society that was sapping it of all its former 
values and worth. Middle-aged people bemoaned the 
crassness and bustle of modern life, and openly 
longed for older, quieter times when life was harder 
but stability reigned: where one could count on
other peoples attitudes and not expect to be 
shocked, outraged, or disoriented every time one 
went out of doors or read a newspaper (Beeman in 
Keddie 1983, 209-10).
For the religious community the new social orientation was sinful. They 
attacked dancing, music, the cinema, and the consumption of liquor. In 
smaller towns, owners of radios would defend ownership by explaining 
they were merely listening to news. Television seemed to meet with 
their approval more readily, and was endorsed even by Ayatollah 
Khomeini, given proper supervision.
Moreover, in undermining the political influence of Shi'ism in 
Iran, secularism had eroded the narrow bridge between the government and 
the people, and thus intensified the aloofness, experienced as extreme 
abrasiveness, of the political system toward the social system 
(Abrahamian in Kedourie and Haim 1980, 99). As some of the educated 
classes argued, had the state been less repressive; more creative and 
instructive thought and action would have been possible, based on a 
broader social base. These intellectuals viewed much of the opposition 
of the clergy as valid. Although many of them "hated” Khomeini--they 
supported his cause because they "hated" the Shah more (Green 1982, 87).
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They are both stubborn and vindictive. They both 
advance simplistic ideas about the problems of their 
country and the world. Neither brooks any 
contradiction. Each considers himself guided by the 
Almighty. They want to be undisputed leaders of the 
people. Their dictatorial spirit knows no 
bounds.... But, of course, they lead different 
lives. Khomeini is an ascetic, while the Shah 
compulsively surrounds himself with pomp and 
ceremony (Hoveyda 1980, 21).
As covered earlier in the text, many of the intellectuals had been 
critical of the Pahlavi regime--and a substantial number of them had 
paid with their life for speaking out. The lucky ones survived prison 
and torture. Some had tried to adjust, and some had just given up. 
Their subsequent cooperation with the religious sector reflected the 
amorphous desire for freedom from oppression and chaos, and for social 
expression, political participation, and economic stability.
Seemingly oblivious to growing hostility, the Shah was quoted in 
Kahan International, in 1976, as saying, "From the domestic viewpont, 
fortunately, I have no worries" (Hoveyda 1980, 163). And also in 1976, 
in his book Towards the Great Civilization, the Shah asserts this:
I have guided my people along this wonderful path of 
Destiny because I felt that only that path could 
insure their dignity and happiness. Having an 
absolute faith in this, it was my duty to set the 
nation such a goal, not only as the person 
responsible for its destiny, but also as the father, 
guide, and friend of every Iranian (Hoveyda 1980,
152) .
In the same year, the Shah celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of 
the dynasty. And soon thereafter, "The last straw came in 1977, when 
the sovereign altered the calendar to start not with Hegira but with the 
foundation of the Persian Empire of Cyrus the Great" (Hoveyda 1980,
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120) .
In May 1977, 54 lawyers expressed the concerns of several other 
professional classes by signing a declaration protesting judicial 
changes that would have subordinated the judiciary to the executive.
Also in May, Khajahouri, a historian, criticized the Rastakhiz Party in 
a letter for its failure to establish a dialogue with the people and the 
government. In June, members of the forbidden National Front sent an 
open letter to the Shah, asking for an end to dictatorship and
implementation of the constitution. In July, 40 writers, in a written
document, called for "creative freedom and end to censorship." Other 
intellectuals asked for "end to despotic rule" in a signed letter. 
Another group of lawyers spoke out against violation of the Constitution 
(Preece 1979, 98-9). The deaths of Tehran slum dwellers in August 1977, 
and the assassination by SAVAK of Khomeini's older son in November 1977, 
finally exploded the volatile climate (Algar in Khomeini 1981, 19). In
October students demonstrated in Tehran, calling for the return of
Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini. As demonstrations escalated into riots, 
the Shah charged that the incidents were indicators of 
"'counter-revolution, black reaction and outright treason'" (Preece 
1979, 99). According to the Shah, the rioters "desired to set the 
country back 1,500 to 2,000 years." As usual, he missed no opportunity
to express his hatred for Khomeini, using the newspaper as vehicle for
his attacks in 1978 (Fischer in Esposito 1983, 159-60). Then, the
monarch visited President Carter in Washington, in November. 
Demonstrations occurred in Tehran. Carter returned the visit in 
December and declared Iran "an island of stability" because of the 
"great leadership of the Shah," and the "respect, admiration, and love"
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the Shah receives from his people.
In the meantime, of the various groups that coalesced around 
Khomeini and that surfaced in 1978-1979, the Liberation Movement was to 
play the most important role. It was one of many groups affiliated with 
the National Front, and enjoyed close ties with Khomeini. Because of 
the leadership of Bazargan and Taleqani, the Movement was able to 
attract "young professionals and technocrats, who, although modern- 
educated, sought to synthesize Islam and Western science" (Abrahamian 
1982, 464). The most outstanding of those was the sociologist Ali 
Shariati. (He died under mysterious circumstances on 19 June 1977, in 
England, after several years of inprisonment in Iran. SAVAK seemed 
implicated in his death) (Akhavi in Keddie 1983, 127). Other 
organizations included the following: 1) the Feda'i, known under this
name since 1971, but established in 1963 by five Tehran University 
students, wanting to destroy the repressive "atmosphere," and prove to 
the masses that only armed struggle leads to liberation; and 2) the 
Mujahedin, founded in 1965 by six recent graduates of Tehran University, 
evolved from the religious wing of the National Front, unlike the Feda'i 
who had Marxist leanings. The Mujadin eventually separated into a 
religious and a Marxist wing. Based on statistics of dead guerrillas, 
most of their membership had come from the young intelligentsia. All of 
the groups had been underground organizations who had labored in vain to 
bring down the regime. During the revolutionary upsurge in late 1977, 
they were prepared to take advantage of the situation. Moreover, after 
the release of many political prisoners in 1978, thanks to President 
Carter's human rights campaign, their ranks swelled in numbers 
(Abrahamian 1982, 462-95). As Algar noted, moreover, when the
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revolution finally came, it was a movement without organized membership. 
Rather, Khomeini issued directives throughout Iran and realized 
immediate massive support of the overwhelming majority of Iranians.
...As for what we call in broad terms the 
[revolutionary] movement, people should not be under 
the illusion that this is a question of a formally 
organised movement with membership criteria, and so 
forth... it was a broad-based Islamic movement and 
not some kind of affair in which people sit down, as 
an examining body, and decide who is worthy to be 
admitted. What is necessary is to recruit, in an 
informal fashion, the massive support of the 
overwhelming majority of the people.... This is what 
happened in Iran. It is not that a secret party or 
organization was set up which brought more and more 
people into the fold....The Revolution was genuinely 
a people's movement. One can say that the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran was an example of mass political 
participation and is unique in modern times (Algar 
in Siddiqui 1980, 65).
The Shah, at the same time, expressed his view of the state of 
affairs in these words:
No profound change can come about in our country 
outside the framework of the monarchic order. The 
monarchic regime as soul, essence, existence, source 
of energy and foundation of the national sovereignty 
and unity constitutes the solid basis of the great 
civilization and the strong custodian of all its 
values, its progress and its material and moral 
gains. This regime will guide and protect the 
destiny of the Iranian people in the most brilliant 
period in their history....The participation of the 
people in all the country's affairs, and the 
government of the people by the people, are now 
reality at every level of social life. The Iranian 
people freely elect their representatives to the 
cooperatives, village councils, local tribunals, 
town and district assemblies and arbitration 
councils. And at a higher level the people 
participate directly in the elections to the 
Rastakhiz party and in sending representatives to
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the town chambers of Parliament. They also enjoy 
full freedom of expression through various party 
organs as well as through the press and information 
media, as a genuine democracy demands (Hoveyda 1980,
151-152).
In the Shah's own words, his aim had always been to assure "health, 
food, clothing, housing and education for all" (Pahlavi 1980, 101). The 
Shah's method, however, involved heavy Western, particularly American 
influence, which included the building of a vast military machinery 
under their guidance, oppression, and a great number of highly visible 
"immorally" behaving friends and relatives. Between 1971 and 1978, 
purchases of arms from the United States reached $19 billion (Hoveyda 
1980, 98). Hoveyda further observed this in relation to the Shah:
Looking back with hindsight I now feel that his 
greatest weakness lay in his relations with his 
family and friends. His brothers and sisters, 
nephews and nieces, brothers- and sisters - in-law 
often did just as they pleased, and their friends' 
behavior could not fail to damage the monarchy, but 
the Shah always forgave the members of his family 
and his immediate entourage. Furthermore, though he 
was feared by all his top civil servants and 
high-ranking officers, he did not dare to lay down 
the law to his relations (1980, 139-40).
OIL AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT: 
TANGIBLE FACTORS IN THE DISTANCING PROCESS
Oil and American involvement were tangible factors in the ongoing 
process, and contributed to the widening gulf between the Shah and the 
bulk of the Iranian people. Oil became the "fuel," in more ways than 
one, for modernization and for the ensuing turmoil. Oil revenues,
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particularly the price explosion of 1973-1974, exacerbated a host of 
potential problems. Those included 1) absorption of oil money into the 
national economy; and 2) increasing Western penetration (Pakravan in 
Pullapilly 1980, 105-125; Sullivan 1981; Looney 1982). Those factors 
influenced the conditions of social organization; because they changed 
"inputs and outputs of energy, information and objects."
To illustrate, Western penetration relates directly to one of the 
most toxic issues of the Iranian Revolution, namely, American influence 
in Iran. It occurred on several levels, the political, the economic, 
and the socio-cultural. Throughout the rule of Shah Mohammed Reza 
Pahlavi, the United States had played a central part in Iranian affairs. 
During World War II, Washington became increasingly aware of the 
strategic importance of Iran, and established an Embassy there in 1944. 
In the context of a twenty-year program of U.S. aid to Iran, an example 
of what America could do "by an unselfish American policy", President 
Roosevelt saw Iran as "experiential station.... something in the nature 
of a clinic" for his war policies (qtd. in Preece 1979, 15). As noted 
earlier, in 1953 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assisted in 
reinstating the Pahlavi government by removing Mossadeq who had been 
responsible for oil nationalization, and thus ended his brief time 
(1952-1953) as Iranian head of state. Supporters of the Shah and the 
American administration had perceived him as too far left. The removal 
of Mossadeq ushered in a harsher dictatorship under the Shah which 
included the establishment of SAVAK in 1957, and the bloody 
counter-revolution in the face of religious uprising in 1963. 
Paradoxically, even the ulama had welcomed the Shah back in 1953, 
considering him the lesser of two evils over the leftist-oriented
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government of Mossadeq. Then, against this backdrop of violence and 
massive demonstrations in Iran that landed Khomeini in exile, Kennedy 
congratulated the Shah on his White Revolution. Johnson praised him on 
his "progress" in Iran that evolved "without violence, and without any 
bloodshed" (Pahlavi 1980, 102). In 1970, the ulama's reaction against a 
meeting of thirty American investors in Tehran led to confrontations 
with the regime. The clergy saw expansion of American investment as a 
"'catastrophe and an annihilating blow for the Iranian people.'"
Khomeini became reaffirmed as marja-i taqlid. Students struck at Tehran 
University and cried "’Long live Khumayni’" (qtd. in Algar in Keddie 
1972, 252). Walking in the bazaar in Yazd in early 1971, Hoveyda 
noticed a small poster announcing, "'The return of the [hidden] Imam is 
at hand'" (Hoveyda 1975, 105). Nixon visited the Shah in 1972 and 
reassured him of American support. Throughout, the United States 
government encouraged the Shah to be a "strong leader." During the 
Carter administration, however, the scenario changed. This change in 
approach, as will be discussed later in the text, may well have pushed 
adjustment processes in Iran, already at their limit, beyond their 
capacity.
To another extent, the quantum jump in oil revenues created 
problems of absorption into the economic development and growth process. 
Revenues stimulated hasty "upward revisions" of development plans with 
dramatic increases in spending. The "runaway cycle" invited increasing 
corruption, galloping inflation, greater inequality in income, and 
increasing dependence on the West to help resolve growing disparities 
(Pakravan in Pullapilly 1980, 116; Looney 1982, 5). Oil revenues 
soared from $3.9 billion in 1973 to $17.4 billion in 1974. In August
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1974, the Shah announced that expenditures under the
Five-Year-Development Plan, begun only one year earlier, would double. 
Projected government expenditures for 1973-1978 were $122.8 
billion--with $98.2 billion (80 percent) derived from oil revenues 
(Green 1982, 51-52). The process beckoned thousands of foreign 
"experts" into the country whose population had historically suffered 
from "xenophobia." By 1977, the number of Americans in Iran exceeded 
42,000, up from 10,000 in 1973 (Stempel 1981, 74). Most of them 
received three to four times more pay than their Iranian counterparts, 
with comparable educational background, for equal work and 
responsibilites. Relations between Americans and Iranians tended to be 
cool--partly because of the ignorance of Americans about Iranian customs 
and traditions, and about the public image of the United States in Iran. 
American companies paid exorbitant rents to house their employees who 
arrived in large groups. Consequently, many Iranians found themselves 
at the bottom of the housing market, unable to compete financially 
(Beeman in Keddie 1983, 204-5). Some American military-equipment 
companies had open-ended contracts with the government of Iran--and 
given certain circumstances, American civilians might have become 
"mercenaries in the structure of the Iranian armed forces" (Sullivan 
1981). While between 1961-70, for instance, industry had grown at an 
annual rate of 13 percent; agriculture had grown barely 3 percent 
(Green 1982, 21). Peasants, displaced by land reform, flocked to the 
cities to share in the new "wealth." There, they suffered from extreme 
culture shock. Confrontation with thousands of Westerners and their 
vastly different culture intensified the feeling of rootlessness they 
already experienced (Kissinger 1979, 1260; Sullivan 1981, 140). As
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Sullivan noted, in search of something familiar and reassuring they 
found solace in the mosque--where they gathered on Fridays (Iranian 
weekends are on Thursdays and Fridays). There they heard the sermons of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, preached through tape recorders from his desert 
retreat in Najaf. This explained why the sermons all over the country 
resembled each other (1981, 140).
Against this volatile background, according to Sullivan, the 
Government of the United States, under President Carter, communicated 
inconsistently and often incoherently with the Shah, either directly, or 
through Sullivan. Consecutive messages often contradicted each other. 
There seemed to be no clear policy in relation to Iran. Moreover, the 
Shah received lectures on human rights and on the virtues of democratic 
political process, crassly lacking in his country (Kissinger 1979, 1261; 
Pahlavi 1980; Jordan 1980). On December 7, 1977, the Iranian Committee 
for the Defense of Liberty and Human Rights came into existence, 
following the request of the Carter Administration. In reaction to it, 
Khomeini charged on February 19, 1978, "In Commemoration of the First 
Martyrs of the Revolution":
As for America, a signatory to the Declaration of 
Human Rights, it imposed this Shah upon us, a worthy 
successor to his father. During the period he has 
ruled, this creature has transformed Iran into an 
offcial colony of the U.S. What crimes he has 
committed in service of his master (qtd. in 
Khomeini 1981, 215)!
Relaxing his grip, in trying to respond and follow conflicting messages 
from Washington, rendered the Shah even less responsive to growing 
unrest at a time that required heightened vigilance. Abrahamian noted
81
four reasons why the experiment of relaxing police controls failed: 1)
because repression of the past twenty five years had destroyed all 
grass-root organizations, labor unions, and independent professional 
associations--there were no leaders left with whom the Shah could 
negotiate in order to coordinate change of course; 2) "the sudden 
change in course coincided with an equally sudden economic recession," 
producing mass unemployment and disillusionment; 3) demonstrations 
shifted the arena of dialogue from the negotiating table into the 
streets; and 4) Khomeini continued his attacks against the contemporary 
Yazid and rejected "any compromise with the 'devil' who had sold Islam 
and Iran to foreigners and whose hands were 'seeped in innocent blood'" 
(1982, 515-17).
At the same time, as Kissinger observed, the Shah maintained an 
"almost naive faith in the United States." He was a "rare leader" and 
an "unconditional ally." He exhibited "...extraordinary trust in 
American purposes and American goodwill... and disintegrated 
psychologically when he sensed that friendship evaporating" (1979,
1261). Michael Blumenthal, the American Secretary of Treasury remarked
after returning from a trip to Iran in late 1978, "'He [the Shah] is not
functioning'" (qtd in Hoveyda 1980, 48).
Reflecting on the events of January 1979, a few days before the 
Shah's departure from Iran, Sullivan offered this:
As far as I could see, the United States government
was facing the situation in Iran with no policy 
whatsoever. The Shah's collapse in my judgement, 
was inevitable, and unless some understandings are 
reached for an accommodation between the armed 
forces and the Islamic forces, I felt that an
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explosion would occur (1981, 225).
Apparently until then the Shah had assumed that the U.S. administration 
had some "grand national design that was intended to save his country... 
and his dynasty." He was, therefore:
... prepared to make personal sacrifices for the 
larger goal. It now suddenly became clear to him, 
as it had to me, that our government’s actions were 
being guided by some inexplicable whim. It was a 
bad day for both of us (Sullivan 1981, 226).
To Carter, however, American interests in Iran were not necessarily 
tied to personal well-being of the Shah (Jordan 1982). To an Iranian 
people, at the brink of revolution, suffering from severe identity 
crises and chronic xenophobia, with an expressed and growing hatred of 
the United States --American influence may well have served as final the 
blow. Under these circumstances, the relationship represented the 
ultimate aloofness, unresponsiveness and insult of the regime toward the 
majority of the Iranian people.
KHOMEINI--THE "PRINCE" WHO LEGITIMATES HIS OWN THREAT SYSTEM
THE IMAM IN THE LINE OF ALI- -THE CHARISMATIC LEADER--THE HERO
From Neauphle-le-Chateau in France, "Imam" Khomeini issued another 
declaration one week before the beginning of Muharram (November 23,
1978) . It advanced the confrontation between the regime of the Shah, 
and the Iranian people "to a point of no return" (Algar in Khomeini 
1981, 242). Using the Karbala symbolism, Khomeini asked for heroism and 
self-sacrifice to defeat "satanic governments," and "tyrants of history"
83
with clenched fists, "just as the leader of Muslims had taught." He 
encouraged "those well informed about the state of the country to draw 
up lists of ministers serving this usurpatory government, or traitors 
and officers who are ordering crimes and massacres throughout the 
country, so that people will know what to do with them at the 
appropriate time" (In Khomeini 1981, 242-43). He addressed students, 
journalists, workers and peasants, bazaar merchants and tradesmen and 
"all classes of the population," including "proud nomadic tribes" and 
"deprived slum dwellers" to advance together "with a single voice and a 
single purpose, to the sacred aim of Islam--the abolition of the cruel 
Pahlavi dynasty, the destruction of the abominable monarchical regime, 
and the establishment of an Islamic republic based on the progressive 
dictates of Islam. Victory is yours, nation arisen in revolt" (In 
Khomeini 1981, 244)! Khomeini ended his declaration in this way:
The history of Iran is witnessing today the most 
sensitive days that Islam and our dear Muslims have 
experienced. Today, great nation, you have come to 
a fork in the road: one way leads to eternal
dignity and splendor, and the other (God forbid), to 
perpetual humiliation and degradation.... There is 
no excuse for any class of people in the nation to 
remain inactive today; silence and apathy mean 
suicide, or even aid to the tyrannical regime....I 
extend a hand of affection and devotion to the noble 
people of Iran, who, with power they derive from 
Islam, have given a heavy punch in the mouth to the 
Shah and his supporters. The martyrs Iran has 
offered, for the sake of justice and divine aims, I 
regard with eternal pride.... Noble nation, you 
have alerted the noble young people of other Islamic 
nations, and we hope that your powerful hand will 
raise up the proud banner of Islam in all regions. 
This is my petition to God, the Exalted (qtd. in 
Khomeini 1981, 245).
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In the process, Khomeini became the charismatic leader of the 
Iranian people. According to Shariati, an Iranian sociologist, this 
term equates with Imam. That is, the revolutionary movement has 
reinterpreted the term Imam to mean "charismatic figure who arises out 
of the people and expresses the general will" (Fischer 1980, 6). 
Accordingly, Khomeini became the "symbolic leader of the revolution" 
(Fischer 1980, 6). While never directly rejecting the title Imam, 
Khomeini carefully captioned his official portraits with Nayib al-Imam 
(Aide to Imam) (Fischer 1980, 6). He is thus assured legitimacy in the 
line of Ali. In its classic Weberian formulation, legitimacy involves 
transformation of naked power into authority which is generally accepted 
and obeyed without frequent resort to coercion (Dekmejian in Curtis 
1981, 33). It is based on the promise that compatible values will be 
pursued.
Upon his return to Iran, Khomeini spoke at Bihisht-i Zahra Cemetary 
in South Tehran, to commemorate the seventeenth of Sharivar (Black 
Friday) at the place where the martyrs of the revolution are buried. He 
spoke on February 2, 1979, at Lot Number 17. His address was 
"illustrative of his power." Though it expressed emotions, he "used 
none of the rhetorical cues for weeping, and no one wept." Although the 
situation lent itself beautifully to a rawzeh--the form of his speech 
was no rawzeh--it was different. "People listened intently and 
applauded once" when he anounced the Islamic government would soon be 
instituted (Fischer 1980, 214). He further asserted this:
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The rule of Muhammed Riza then, is illegal, first, 
because the rule of his father was also illegal, and 
the Constituent Assembly was convened in his time at 
bayonet-point; second, if we suppose the rule of 
Riza Shah to have been legal, those who put him in 
power had no right to determine our destiny.... In 
any event, even if the foundation of the Pahlavi 
monarchy had been legitimate and the Constituent 
Assembly were functioning legally at the time, our 
people are declaring today that they do not now want 
this ruler. They are, in effect, voting against 
Muhammad Riza and the monarchical form of 
government, which is their right. The institution 
is therefore invalid (Khomeini 1981, 255-56).
Hussein had finally beaten Yazid. The observation of one believer who 
had discovered his "Islamic Identity" may sum up what had transpired. 
Participating in one of the demonstration marches he was moved to 
remark, "'there was no longer an I but only a We'" (qtd in Arani 1980, 
12).
THE SHAH FROM EXILE: DISTANCE EXEMPLIFIED THROUGH HIS VIEWS
The tables had turned, the Shah, in exile seemed uncomprehending. 
He offered this:
Of course, I continue to focus on events in my 
homeland, past and present. Certainly, I had made 
mistakes in Iran. However, I cannot believe they 
formed the basis for my downfall. They were 
rectifiable in time. My country stood on the verge 
of becoming a great civilization. The forces 
against me, however, proved stronger, although they 
were gathered without unified motive or larger 
purpose (Pahlavi 1980, 34).
His vision of the future for his country in no way seemed to coincide
with that of the mass of his people. The distance between them had been
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too great for him to really see and to really understand. Neither 
negotiations nor compromises had been possible across this gulf. The 
result was alienation and disintegration. Paradoxically, he expected 
others to be different. For instance, he expressed anger over the 
ignorance he perceived of the West in relation to Iran. In the same 
breath he showed his own ignorance about his country and people. He 
charged:
Much of the opposition aroused in the West seems to 
have been triggered by ignorance, and a warped view 
of what Iran should be.... I have never understood 
British and American inability to recognize Iran as 
a truly independent nation.... Part of the answer,
I think, lies in the West's lack of interest in 
Iran's history and its failure to understand the 
difference between Persia, both ancient and modern, 
and itself. My own answer to history, therefore, 
must begin with the history of my country, the 3000 
years of Persian civilization that, misunderstood, 
has led to the defeat of Iran's attempt to enter the 
twentieth century, perhaps presaging an even greater 
defeat of the countries I considered friends and 
allies (Pahlavi 1980, 34).
CONCLUSION
Without divine favor my revolution would not have 
been possible. Without God's support I would be a 
man like all the rest. And divine assistance will 
guarantee the continuation of our work (Shah 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi qtd. in Hoveyda 1980,
122-23).
From the religious point of view I am entitled to 
act as I do... When I saw the scale of movement, I 
saw God in it. That cannot be the work of a man 
(Ayatollah Khomeini qtd. in Hoveyda 1980, 121).
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Both, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini 
considered themselves to be defending the core of their civilization 
against corruption and destruction (Beeman in Keddie 1983, 197-98). For 
each the core of civilization differed greatly. For the Shah, it was a 
Persia, ancient and great, rapidly adapting to modern ways, to become a 
leader of the world. For the Imam, it was a nation rooted in the 
millenium-old vision of a Golden Age in Islam, prevented by a usurper 
who had to be destroyed. Thus, the ensuing struggle involved more than 
abstract definitions of a valid core. Rather, for many Iranians it 
pivoted on a real, central feature of their existence.
In inheriting a dictatorship from his father, and thus a threat 
system, the Shah had also inherited distance, as defined by Boulding, 
separating him from the citizens of Iran. Distance prevents effective 
two-way communication. Dialogue, mutual understanding, and nurturance 
become impossible. Erosion of support and alienation follow. Across 
the gulf, the Shah imposed rapid modernization on Iran, insensitive to 
the needs, opinions and sentiments of many Iranians, and insensitive to 
the integrative and exchange systems, intertwined in a complex way. To 
deter subsequent opposition, the Shah used force in the form of his 
military establishment, and later of SAVAK, thus concretizing and 
amplifying the threat system. In the absence of nurturance and of any 
kind of free expression, suppressing Shi'ism, the integrative system, he 
substituted force in an effort to hold "things together." In addition, 
the Shah tried to inject charisma and facilitate social cohesion through 
numerous splendid affairs, and by trying to project a father image. The 
celebrations, however, only managed to widen the gulf. For one, because 
in their context, the Shah insulted believers by asserting pre-islamic,
88
pagan roots. For another, because he repelled many intellectuals and 
others with his display of wealth and conspicuous consumption in the 
face of poverty in many areas of Iran. As father to the nation, 
moreover, he became perceived as tyrannical and oppressive, rather than 
understanding and caring.
The issue of legitimate leadership as central theme of Shi'i Islam, 
placed the Shah on tenuous ground from the beginning of his rule. In 
the context of instability, consistent with any threat system, this 
issue took on eschatological dimensions. That is to say, the Shah might 
have survived in power longer, had his view of the world and subsequent 
course of action not been perceived by the Shi'a as threatening Islam 
itself, and thus, their very existence. At least, this is what the 
voice of the Iranian Shi’a, Khomeini, asserted. He perceived not only 
Iran, but Islam itself to be in danger. He used the issue of legitimate 
rule by the Imam in the line of Ali, as argument to overthrow the 
oppressive, usurpatory government--as he manipulated symbols, beliefs, 
and rituals of Shi'i Islam. His challenges and threats escalated in 
intensity, consistent with the Iranians escalating threat of "being at 
issue." In that sense, his declarations became the barometer for the 
level of stress and anxiety present in Iranian society. In the process, 
Khomeini became the charismatic leader for the majority of Iranians. He 
led the revitalization movement which reduced the stress level in the 
system, by simplifying the repertoire, and by serving as unifying, 
organizing, integrating principle in opposition to the regime. He 
became the "prince" who legitimated his own threat system in the name of 
Islam. Shi'ism, therefore, became the equilibrating force in an anomic 
environment, historically rooted in instability, and contemporarily
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subjected to rapid change, oppression and corruption. Shi'ism served as 
integrative system with the promise of safety and justice. As in the 
early days of Islam, the belief system constricted to serve a boundary 
maintaining function, in the absence of a well-defined, concrete 
boundary of the state. Khomeini presided over the "closing of the 
system."
Intellectuals and other groups joined believers in following 
Khomeini because he seemed to offer the only avenue from oppression, 
non-participation, corruption, overconsumption and disintegration. In 
contrast to the image of the United States and of the Shah, as corrupt, 
inconsistent, wasteful and sinful--Khomeini appeared incorruptible, 
consistent and dynamic. He led a simple life, and refused to compromise 
with satanic powers (Abrahamian 1982, 531-2). In this sense, Shi'ism 
became the apparent contemporary solution for many Iranians. It 
promised to transform Iranian society into a "just social system."
Iranians perceived the United States as having played a central 
part in the demise of Iran, and in having propagated a puppet, the Shah. 
America became the "great Satan" and the Shah the "Yazid of the Age." 
Because villain images embody anxiety in personal form, America and the 
Shah became the focus for hostility. They also served the functions of 
sustaining moral vigilance, preparing for the affirmative entrance of a 
hero, and reminding the faithful of "what kinds of people are to be 
feared." Khomeini became the Imam.
At the core of these dynamics lie centuries of religious tradition 
of secrecy, martyrdom and revolt--where "'dying power'" by far outweighs 
"'killing power.'" Dying power "'constitutes the strength of social 
movements,'" and "'changes the world'" (Hoveyda 1980, 107). Dying is 
preferable to disintegration.
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Let no man say that I have said nothing new--the 
arrangement of the material is new. In playing 
tennis, we both use the same ball, but one of us 
places it better. I would just as soon be told that 
I have used old terms. Just as the same thoughts 
differently arranged form a different discourse, so 
the same words, differently arranged form different 
thoughts (Pascal 1950, 358).
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APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY
Abbasids: the caliphs who ruled the Islamic community from
750-1258 A.D. from their capital, Baghdad, 
alim (singular of ulama): learned man.
aql: the reasoning of interpretation given by a mujtahid.
awqaf (plural of waqf): religious endowments.
ayatollah: 'sign of God'--an honorific title given to leading
Shi'ite mutj tahids. 
caliph: successor to Muhammad as leader of the Muslim community,
(Arabic Khalifa: successor).
The four 'orthodox' or 'rightly guided' caliphs, according to the 
Sunnis, are Abu-Bakr (623-4), Umar (634-44), Uthman (644-56) and 
Ali (656-61). For the Shi'a the first three are usurpers, and Ali 
was Muhammad's directly designated successor, 
faqih: jurist, expert in divine law.
fatwa: official ruling on a point of Islamic law.
fifth plan: Iran's development plans were of varying lengths. They
were as follows: First Development Plan 1948-1955; Second Develop­
ment Plan 1955-1962; Third Development Plan 1962-1968; Fourth 
Development Plan 1968-1973; Fifth Development Plan 1973-1978.
Fida iyan-i Islam: a militant fundamentalist organization
established in 1945 with the aim of restoring the pure Islam of the 
Prophet. 
fiq: Islamic jurisprudence.
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hadith: sayings attributed to Prophet Muhammad.
hawza: circle, a mode in which education takes place at the madrasah,
ijma: the opinions commonly agreed upon by the imams,
ijtihad: the use of independent judgement in interpreting Islamic
law.
imam: one of 12 descendents of the Prophet through his cousin Ali,
the first in the line. As "'proofs of God,'" designated by God as 
spiritual authorities, their oustanding qualities are supposed to 
enable them to "transmit God's light to believers."
Imam: the messiah. His advent will inaugurate the age of justice
in the world, 
imamat: the institution of the rule of the imams.
Islam: "submission to the will of God."
ismat: chastity, a quality attributed to the imams.
Ithna' Ashariyah: "twelvers," a Shi'i sect, dominant in Iran,
believed that the line of imams extended to 12. The last imam will 
return to this world as Mahdi, and establish justice, 
jihad: a holy war conducted on behalf of the Islamic community,
kadkhuda: "little god"; the village headmen, and/or agent of
the landlord in rural society, or the leader of a tribal clan,
khums: "one-fifth," the amount of income tax Muslims are expected to
contribute to the mujtahids.
Koran (Qur'an): the Word of God, as revealed to, and communicated by,
Muhammad.
madrasa: the traditional theological seminary of Islam for the
training of religious teachers. Scholarly hierarchy consists of six 
levels, namely: entry level, talib ilm or"learner"; second level,
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mujtahid or "someone who has exerted himself so as to be able and 
frame an opinion"; third level, mubelleg al-risala or "carrier of 
the message"; fourth level, hojat al-Islam or "authority of 
Islam" (at this level the student has his own hawza); fifth level, 
ayatollah or "sign of God"; sixth level, ayatollah al-uzma or 
"great sign of God". There can only be five of the last category 
at any one time. Anyone at this level personifies the "individual 
to be referred to on everything," immune to arrest even under the 
Shah. Khomeini belongs in this group.
Mahdi: "the rightly guided one," the messiah, for the 'twelvers,'
the 12th Imam. His return will inaugurate the age of justice in this 
world.
Majlis: the Iranian parliament; a council, assembly,
milk: private property.
Muharram: religious month of mourning.
mujtahid: one who is qualified to exercise ijtihad, or interpretive 
reason, to clarify the intent of Islamic law. 
mulla: a lower-ranking member of the ulama, that is, a clergy man,
preacher, used to be the term for one who was literate, generic term 
for clergy man. 
mumin: believer, one who has religious faith,
muslim: submitter.
Nayib al-Imam: Aide to Imam. (It is how Khomeini captions his official
portraits--the revolutionaries of 1977-1979, however, call him Imam.) 
Pahlavi: the dynasty ruling Iran from 1925-1979.
Qajar: the dynasty ruling Iran from 1785-1925. 
rawda: preachment, homilistic sermon.
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Safavids: the Safavi dynasty, ruling Iran from 1501-1722.
sayyid: direct descendent of the prophet, entitled to wear a green or
black turban.
shaykh: a wise leader, an elder.
Shaykh al-Islam: an official appointed by the Shah, from the ranks
of the clergy, to serve in each of the major cities of Iran.
shari'a: the law of Islam, therefore, the divine law.
shar': canon law, religious courts.
Shi1 a (Shi’ite): the sects in Islam which view Ali, Muhammed's son-in-
law and cousin, as his rightful successor, and his line as legitimate 
leadership of the world Muslim community.
Shi' i: of the Shi' ah.
Sufism: a mystical counterculture and religious tradition found
throughout the Muslim world.
Sunna: the 'beaten path,' the traditions of the prophet's practices
and behavior, also those who believe in the legitimacy of the 
caliphate of Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman, and the rule of the Umayyad 
dynas ty.
Sunni: of the orthodox branch of Islam, who consider themselves
followers of the authentic Sunna--as opposed to the Shi'a, for 
example.
talib: religious student.
taqiyya: the principle of dissimulation of belief for the purpose of
protecting the shi'i community from annihilation.
taqlid: following one more learned than oneself, imitating a religious
authority.
taqut: term from the Koran with emotive force, denotes tyrannical
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earthly power and omnipotence that belongs to God alone, used by 
Khomeini in reference to the Shah.
ulama: religious leaders, learned men, scholars of Islam.
Umayyads: the dynasty with its seat in Damascus, that controlled the
caliphate from 661-750 A. D..
umma: the religious community, followers of the prophet.
’ urf: customary law.
usul: the principles of Islamic legal authority.
valayat: allegiance to the rule of the imams, their rule, based on
their ability to interpret the holy law, particularly its esoteric 
meaning.
waqf: permanent endowment or trust.
White Revolution: Promulgated in 1963, it first included six steps,
and was later increased by 11 more. The complete 17 steps were as 
follows: 1.land reform 2.nationalization of forests and pastures
3.public sale of state-owned factory shares as security for land 
reform 4.profit sharing in industry 5.reform of electoral law 
6.creation of a Literacy Corps 7.creation of the Health Corps (1964)
8.creation of the Reconstruction and Development Corps (1964)
9.creation of Houses of Equity (1965) 10.nationalization of water 
resources (1967) 11.call for urban and rural reconstruction (1967)
12. call for administrative and educational reforms (1967) 13.call
for expansion of ownership in industry (1975) 14.equitable pricing 
and antiprofiteering campaign (1975) 15.free education and free meals 
for primary school children (1975) 16.free nutrition for pregnant 
women and infants (1975) 17.national social security (1975).
zakat: the poor-rate prescribed by the Koran. It is for the support
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of widows and orphans, and is levied annually on the capital of 
believers. 
zulm: oppression, hurt.^
A NOTE ON SPELLING 
Because of variations in transliteration among the sources 
used for this thesis, some Persian or Arabic words may be 
spelled differently within the text, particularly in direct 
quotes. For the same reason, they may also differ slightly from 
their spelling in the glossary.
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APPENDIX B
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT HISTORICAL EVENTS
Pre-Medean
ca. 6000-2000 B.C. ------ Settled agriculture among indigenous
peoples; brick dwellings; pottery; 
major settlements at Susa, Tepe 
Hisar, Sialk, Tepe Gujan, Zuriyeh,
ca. 1500 B.C. ----------  Migratory invasions into region by
Medes, Scythians, and Parsua (Persians)
Medean Empire (614 B.C.) -- Medean chief, Cyaxeres (Uvakhstra),
captured and leveled Assyrian capital, 
Nineveh; expansion of area under 
Medean control; the Parsua became 
vassals of Medes
Achaemenids (550-330 B.C.) - Cambyses I, son of Cyrus I, married
a daughter of Medean king; their 
son, Cyrus II, subjugated Medes and 
then established a world empire; 
Zoroastrianism became most important 
religion
Cyrus II (559-529 B.C.) -- Capture of Babylon in 539 B.C.; empire
extended east to Hindu Kush 
Cambyses II (529-522 B.C.)- Invaded and captured Egypt, Palestine,
Syria, and parts of Asia Minor
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Darius I (522-486 B.C.) ---
Xerxes (486-465 B.C.) ....
465-330 B.C. ............
Greek Occupation 
331-323 B.C. --
311-150 B.C. --
Parthian Empire 
(129 B.C.-A.D. 226)
Crushed Egyptian revolt; Battle of 
Marathon in 490 B.C.; retreat of 
empire to Asia Minor 
Period of military defeats in west 
Disintegration of Achaemenid power; 
last ruler in dynasty killed by his 
subj ects
Alexander the Great invaded and con­
quered region; Hellenistic culture 
amalgamated with indigenous culture 
Descendants of Alexander's general, 
Seleucus, sought to maintain geogra­
phical integrity of empire in face 
local rebellions and foreign incur­
sions
Parthian Arsacids expanded and even­
tually overcame Seleucids; assimi­
lation of Greek governmental prac­
tices; old Persian title king of 
kings restored; country organized 
on feudal basis with vassal princes
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Sassanian Empire 
(A.D. 226-641)
Islamic Conquest 
ca. 642-ca. 800
ca. 800-ca. 1050
Seljuq Empire 
(1037-1157)
First native dynasty since Achaemenids 
and was patterned after them; king 
relied on Zorostrian clergy and nobi­
lity to operate highly centralized 
government; entrenched class system
Arab Muslim armies overcame and easily 
conquered region, which falls under 
rule of Arab caliphates; by ca. 800 
bulk of inhabitants converted to Islam; 
country divided into provinces headed 
by military governors; most 
administrators Iranians
Rise of minor and localized dynasties; 
Iranian nationalism expressed in grow­
ing adherence to Shiite (Shia) Islam; 
literature expressed pre-Islamic themes 
and language
Seljuq Turks conquered local kingdoms, 
incorporating them into Seljuq Empire; 
Seljuqs sought to reassert Sunni Islam; 
rise of the "Assasins," an Ismaili group 
committed to political resistance to 
Seljuq, Sunni rule
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Mongol Invasions ........  In 1220 armies of Genghis Khan invaded
and devastated much of Iran
Ilkhanid Dynasty -------  Successors of Mongol invaders converted
(1256-ca. 1375) to Islam and adopted Iranian culture;
excellent administration and extensive 
patronage of the arts
Timurid Dynasty ........  Central-Asian Turkic-speaking people led
(ca. 1375-1499) by Timur (Tamerlane) wrest control of
Iran from Ilkhanids, whose administra­
tive procedures were retained; flou­
rishing of arts and sciences, period of 
famous poet Hafiz
Safavid Dynasty (1502-1736) First native dynasty in eight centuries;
traced its line to Seventh Shia Imam. 
Shia Islam proclaimed state religion; 
shah had virtually absolute rule; 
period of intense nationalism
Shah Abbas (1587-1628) -- Opened Iran to west; granted concessions
to Dutch and British; public works at 
state expense; consolidation of power 
of the monarchy
Afshar Dynasty (1736-50) -- Nadir Shah, tribesman from north the and
military genius, proclaimed himself
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Zand Dynasty (1750-94) ---
Qajar Dynasty (1796-1925) -
Fath Ali Shah 
(1797-1834)
Nasir al Din Shah 
(1848-96)
1905-06
1907
shah; numerous forays into India; 
overtaxation of land; poor administra­
tion
Muhammad Karim Khan Zand established 
dynasty with capital in Shiraz; 
many social and community improvements; 
struggle for supremacy among Turkish 
tribes
Turkish Qajar tribe established itself 
as central power; landlords acquired 
greater power 
Army ill equipped; by Treaty of 
Gulistan, Georgia ceded to Czarist 
Russia; intense rivalry between 
Russia and Great Britain for Iranian 
interests
Sought to create modern army; commer­
cial concessions made to British to 
increase holdings of treasury; public 
agitation against foreign influence 
Shah forced to proclaim constitution 
and establish an elective assembly 
Iran divided into spheres of influence 
by Russia and Great Britain
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1908-11 -------- ----- Shah's counterconstitutional coup over­
turned by tribal forces
1914-17-------- -------  Iran declared itself neutral in World
War I and was then occupied by Russian 
and British troops; central government 
emasculated
1921-1945 --------------  Coup d'etat led by Reza Khan; tribal
rebellions suppressed; 1924 end of 
Qajar Dynasty
Pahlavi Dynasty (1925-1979) Reza Khan founded Pahlavi dynasty and
instituted numerous westernizing re­
forms; oil royalties used to finance 
development
1941------ -.......  Iran declared itself neutral in 1939;
British, Russian, and American troops 
invaded and occupied Iran; Reza Shah 
abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi, who succeeded to throne 
1951-53 ................ Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq natio­
nalized oil industry, which provoked 
boycott by European powers; Mossadeq 
ousted; return of shah to position of 
central authority
1959-1962 --------------  Land reform bill of 1959, ratified in
1960, an effort to proportion land more 
fairly among the population; the bill
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evoked intense opposition from Khomeini, 
and other religious leaders, and there­
fore, remained inoperative; the cabinet 
approved a new version in 1962
1963 ..   Proclamation by shah of White Revolution
(Shah-People Revolution); demonstrations 
resulted; Khomeini declared the end to 
taqiyya (dissimulation); he was arrested 
on June 4, and released to Qum, the "holy 
city," after two months. On June 5, a 
"day of infamy," massive demonstrations 
occurred, "thousands died"
1964 ------------------- Khomeini exiled to Turkey on November 4
1965 ................... Majlis conferred title Arymehr (Light of
The Aryans) on shah; Khomeini went into 
exile in Najaf, Iraq, from Turkey
1967 ------------------- Formal coronation of Shah and Shahbanou;
Reza Cyrus, their eldest son, named crown 
prince
1971..................  Persepolis ceremony to celebrate the
2500th anniversary of the monarchy, 
attended by hundreds of foreign heads of 
state; shah reasserts pre-Islamic, Aryan 
roots
1973-1974 --------------  Shah announced Five-Year-Development-Plan
in 1973, in August 1974 he doubled pro­
jected expenditures under the plan.
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1975 -...... ...... ....  On March 2 the shah announced the estab­
lishment of a single party system in 
Iran, the Rastakhiz party
1977 ------------------- The shah altered the calendar to start not
with Hijra (Muslim calendar) but with the 
foundation of the pre-Muslim, Persian 
Empire by Cyrus the Great; seen as "the 
last straw" by many Shi’is of Iran;
1979 --------- --------- January 16, the reign of Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi ended when he was forced from 
the throne by Khomeini; he left the
country; on February 1, Khomeini
13returned to Iran.
105
APPENDIX C 
COUNTRY PROFILE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION
Country
Formal Name: Empire of Iran
Short Form: Iran
Term for Citizens: Iranian
Capital: Tehran
Georgraphy
Size: Land area of about 636,000 square miles; sovereignty claimed
over territorial waters up to twelve nautical miles.
Topography: Large central plateau surrounded on three sides by
rugged mountain ranges. Highest peak is Mount Damavand, about 
18,000 feet above sea level.
Climate: Annual rainfall amounts to about fifty inches in the
mountains of the west and southwest, heaviest concentrations between 
December and March; in the Central Plateau desert, less than two 
inches. Temperatures range from -18°F in the mountainous 
northwest to 132°F in parts of the desert. In the northwest, 
winters often exeed six months, summers are mild and short.
In the desert, temperatures drop to freezing in winter--summers are 
hot and long--some areas may experience no rain for years.
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Society
Population: Estimated at over 34 million in mid-1977, growing
annually at a rate of 2.7 percent. Population nearly evenly 
divided between urban and rural, less than 5 percent are nomads 
and seminomads.
Education and Literacy: Education basically free up to secondary
levels; at higher levels, financial assistance is available. 
Enrollments doubled between 1963 and 1973. Expansion continued 
through the late 1970s. Literacy estimated at 37 percent in 1977, 
despite efforts and growth of Literacy Corps. Students flock to 
universities, both local and abroad. In 1977 an estimated 60,000 
Iranians studied abroad, the majority in the United States.
Health: Infant diseases, gastrointestinal diseases, diseases of the
respiratory system, and parasitic diseases are reported as major 
causes of mortality. In spite of growing medical services in the 
mid 1970s, with 12,000 doctors in practice, an additional 22,000 
doctors are needed.
Languages: The official language is Farsi (known as Persian
outside Iran), spoken by over half of the population, and a second 
language for the majority of the remainder. Other important 
languages are Turkic, Kurdish, and Arabic.
Ethnic Groups: At 63 percent Persians are the largest ethnic
group. In addition, Kurds, Azarbaijanis, Lurs, Baktiars,
Qashqais, Baluchi, and Arabs are important groups.
Religion: Shi'i Islam is the official state religion--
approximately 90 percent of the population are Shi'i Muslims.
Other religious groups are Sunni Muslims, Jews, Armenian
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Christians, Assyrians Christians, Bahais, and Zoroastrians. 
Government and Politics
Governmental Structure: Constitutional monarchy and highly
centralized unitary state. Shahanshah Moahmmad Reza Pahlavi makes 
the major decisions in affairs of state. He ascended to the throne 
in 1941, and is the head of state, and the de facto head of 
government. At the same time, the prime minister, appointed by 
the Shah to chair the cabinet of ministers, technically holds that 
position. The system of government is based on the Constitution of 
1906 and 1907, and consists of the executive, bicameral legislature 
(the lower house Majlis and Senate), and the judiciary branches. 
Politics: Since March 1975, Iran has a one-party system under
the Iran National Resurgence Party (the Rastakhiz-e-Mellat-e-Iran 
or, the Rastakhiz Party). The party serves as political tool of 
the system, centered on the Shah, and reaffirms these three major 
principles: the unquestionable supremacy of the monarchy, the
Constitution, and the Shah-People or White Revolution. (See 
Glossary). In 1977 political and governmental policies and 
actions remain committed to the course set forth in 1963, in 
an effort to achieve the goals of national modernization under 
the programs of the White Revolution. The armed forces are the 
most important power base for the Shah. Political opposition 
seems minor, yet vocal, and potentially volatile, particularly 
if diverse groups, such as the intellectuals, the college 
students, and some religious leaders find a common organizational 
focus. The Shah's secret police, the National Intelligence and
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Security Organization (Sazeman Ettelaat va Amniyat Kashvar-- 
SAVAX) is omnipresent, reducing the possibility of organized 
dissidence.
Administrative Divisions: Iran is divided into three provinces
(ostans), each under a governor general (ostanddar). Each province 
is subdivided into districts (sharestans), each under a governor 
(farmandar). Districts are again divided into subdistricts 
(bakhsh), under lieutenant governors (bakhsdar), and into cities 
and towns. Subdistricts are parceled into countries or 
townships (dehistans), under sherriffs (dehdar), and then into 
villages (deh), under village headmen (kadkhudas-see Glossary).
All local heads, except for the village headmen, are appointed, 
and answer to the central Ministry of Interior.
Judicial System: It consists of the following arms--the Supreme
Court or Court of Cassation, the courts of appeal or high courts, 
the houses of equity for rural areas, and the councils of 
arbitration for cities. In addition, military courts play an 
integral part, with jurisdiction loosely defined in relation to 
political crimes.
International Affairs: Allied with the West multilaterally
through the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and 
bilaterally with the United States. Increasingly emphasizing 
importance of self-reliant defense capability, and independent 
foreign policy posture. Member of the United Nations (UN), 
cultivating diplomatic relations with over 120 nations.
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Economy
Salient Features: A developing country striving for an
industrial base and for self-sustaining growth. Gross National 
Product (GNP) in fiscal year 1976 was US$57.5 billion.
GNP per year capita in September 1977 was US$2,200. In the same 
year, the economy of Iran ranked 15th in the noncommunist 
world. GNP growth rate a year in fiscal years 1971-1974 
was 29 percent in constant prices. Iran has considerable 
natural resources.
Oil Industry: In 1976, Iran was the fourth largest producer
and the second largest exporter of oil in the world. In the 
same year, oil revenues amounted to about US$20 billion.
Without new finds, oil production is expected to decline in 
the 1980s.
Industry: Major source of employment in 1975, and accounted
for 18 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It had grown 
rapidly since 1960, and included manufacturing, construction, 
water, and power. Manufacturing involved a wide range of 
specialties, from handicraft carpets, to state of the art 
technology in processing steel and petrochemicals.
Agriculture: Employed 30 percent of the workforce in 1975,
and accounted for 9 percent of the GDP. Sector grew more slowly 
in the 1970s than the population, attributed to scarce water 
supplies, and to outdated farming practices. Iran aims to 
be self-sufficient in grains by the 1980s. At the same time, 
it will likely remain a large importer of food for many years. 
Foreign Trade: Trade predominantly with industrialized nations.
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In 1976, exports US$15 billion--96 percent from oil; imports 
US$13 billion--52 percent intermediate goods, 30 percent machinery, 
and 18 percent consumer goods.
International Finance: Heavy foreign borrowing in 1976 and 1977
to support budget and development. Large foreign aid and invest­
ment program. Some foreign corporations invested directly. Net 
exporter of capital in 1974-75 fiscal year.
Currency: Rial
Transportation and Communications
Roads: In 1976 Iran had approximately 34,000 miles of roads,
including 12,000 miles of asphalt, 11,000 of surfaced feeder 
roads, and 11,000 miles of cultivated earth. Main areas connected 
without sufficient feeder roads. Some areas lacked roads and 
modern transport.
Railroads: Approximately 2,700 miles of track with connections
to Turkey and to the Soviet Union. Additional tracks planned. 
Airports: Eighteen major airports on 1976, two of those, Tehran
and Abadan, were international.
Pipelines: Approximately 5,100 miles in 1976--used for transport
of crude, petroleum products, and natural gas.
Communications: Most advanced telecommunications in the Middle
East. About 800,000 phones in 1976, falling far short of demand.
National Security
Armed Forces (1977): Army--220,000; Navy--30,000; Air Force--
100,000, largely conscripted.
Ill
Combat Units and Major Equipment (1977): Army--four infantry
divisions, three armored divisions, four independent brigades 
one surface-to-air missile (SAM) battalion. Army Aviation 
Command--over 3,000 tanks, over 600 combat helicopters (some 
of those still on order). Navy--about 60 combat vessels, 
such as destroyers, frigates, and hovercraft; three marine 
battalions; naval air--40 aircraft. Air Force--22 fighter 
squadrons, one reconaissance squadron, three SAM battalions, 
652 combat aircraft, including those on order.
Military Budget (1976): US$9.5 billion, amounts to about
30 percent of government expenditures and to 17.4 percent 
of GDP.
Police Agencies (1977): Gendarmerie--75,000; National
Police--40,000; SAVAK--estimated 10,000.
Foreign Military Treaties: Member of CENTO--and connected
with the United States through the following executive 
agreement of 1959: "...in case of aggression against Iran,
the...United States...will take such appropriate action,
including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually
^  n 1 4agreed upon...."
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NOTES
 ^Wallace 1966, explains this kind of process in terms of
"revitalization movements." I will include his theoretical perspective
in my section called "Relationship to Theoretical Empirical Knowledge;"
Sunderland in Fischer 1968, 680, notes that "... when many social rules
are simultaneously contravened, social difficulty and chaos ensue." The
result may be disastrous "... in all known instances there eventually
emerges a new social order."
2 Klapp 1978, 82-96, discusses some ways which facilitate and 
signal that societies are stressed, and that "closing" of the system is 
occurring." For instance they use metaphors and images depicting 
certain personalities or groups as villains, thus expressing internal
disorder or "entropy."
3
See Shils 1975, 258, on what constitutes this centrality.
He also elaborates on the relation between "charisma" and the need for
order, 261-263.
4 This section is primarily based on Watt 1961, 1980;
Hodgson 1974, I. Other sources include Voll 1982.
The Muslim year is based in the lunar calender, containing 
twelve months and 354 days. The months are as follows: Muharram,
Safar, Rabi I, Rabi II, Jumada I, Jumada II, Rajab, Sha'ban, Ramadan, 
Shawwal, Dhu’l-Qa'da, Dhu'l-Hijja (Tritton 1951, 193).
There are five pillars of Islam, namely, the profession of 
faith, prayer, alms, fasting, and pilgrimage; the five persons of the 
"ahl el-beit," namely, Mohammad, Fatima, Ali, Hassan and Husayn; the 
five daily prayers, and more (Heikal 1981, 83).
113
 ^Baraheni 1977, is one of the writers who survived 
imprisonment and torture. His book is an account of the experience.
g
Hooglund 1982, offers and extensive study on land reform in
Iran between 1960 and 1980.
9
The raid on the students at Fayziya Madrasa had been led by
Khosrodad who later became Commander of the Air Force under the Shah.
He was American trained. During the revolution of 1977-1979, he was
among the first to be executed by the revolutionary tribunal. Khomeini
refers to him as "vile individual" whose name he will mention at the
appropriate time (Khomeini 1981, 180).
^  The following section on Khomeini, including quotes from
his speeches, is taken primarily from Fischer in Esposito 1983, 154-58. 
11- See Watt 1961, 14, on the connection of the Persian Empire
to Judaism.
12 The following served as sources for the Glossary: Area 
Hanbook for Iran 1978, 477-479; Akhavi 1980, ix-xiii; Fischer 1980,
289-292; Mortimer 1982, 21-24.
13 Area Handbook for Iran 1978, xi-xiii, served a major
source for the Chronology of Important Historical Events.
14 The Country Profile was taken from Area Handbook for Iran 
1978, xv-xix.
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